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	 Abstract	
	
										This	article	makes	a	comprehensive	assessment	of	the	effect	of	a	fiscal	policy	shock	in	
Brazil.	I	found	that	gross	domestic	product	does	not	rise	in	the	short	run	in	response	to	the	
fiscal	policy	shock	albeit	it	rises	in	the	long	run.	In	addition,	I	found	that	unlike	an	advanced	
economy	like	the	USA,	the	response	of	both	fiscal	and	monetary	variables	estimated	in	the	
VAR	are	very	volatile	with	the	stock	price	index	which	represents	Brazil’s	financial	sector	in	
the	VAR	model	responding	negatively	(revenue	shock)	to	the	policy	innovation	in	the	short	
run	while	rising	and	falling	below	the	steady	state	several	times	throughout	the	forecasting	
horizon.	 Possible	 explanations	 for	 these	 results	 includes	 weak	 economic	 and	 political	
institutional	 frameworks	 leading	 to	 weak	 transmission	 mechanisms	 of	 fiscal	 policy	
innovations.	 In	 fact	when	government	expenditure	 is	 not	used	 for	 infrastructure	projects,	
utility-generating	 economic	 activities	 or	 externalities	 that	 gets	 onto	 the	 economic	
production	 function,	 then	 extra	 government	 expenditure	 ends	 up	 taking	 resources	 away	
from	the	Brazilian	economy.	 	
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	 Introduction	Motivation	for	Research	
	
										The	 global	 financial	 crises	 produced	 new	 and	 distinctive	 economic	 challenges	 for	
policymakers	and	demanded	extraordinary	policy	responses.	The	early	stages	of	 the	crises	
called	 for	an	exceptional	monetary	policy	 response	 to	stabilise	 the	global	 financial	 system	
but	 the	 credit	 channel	 was	 found	 to	 be	 uncharacteristically	 weak	 thus	 prompting	
governments	 to	 turn	 to	 fiscal	 policy	 to	 enhance	 aggregate	 demand	 and	 revive	 economic	
growth.	During	the	said	global	economic	crises,	advanced	economies	were	in	recession	but	
growth	markets	like	Brazil	continued	to	grow	albeit	not	as	fast	as	pre	2008	recession	levels.	
In	 fact	 while	 output	 in	 advanced	 economies	 had	 fallen	 from	 an	 average	 of	 1.8%	 to	 -5%,	
emerging	economies	were	on	average	growing	at	a	rate	of	1%	from	a	pre-recession	high	of	
7%	(Abiad,	et	al.,	2012)	prompting	analysts	to	make	a	case	for	an	economic	decoupling	of	
emerging	economies	from	advanced	economies	(ibid).		
										The	 transmission	mechanism	of	 a	 fiscal	 policy	 shock	 is	well	 understood	 in	 advanced	
economies	but	not	so	much	 in	emerging	economies	 for	 two	reasons.	Firstly,	a	majority	of	
the	research	on	fiscal	policy	shocks	have	been	on	advanced	economies	(Caldara	&	Kamps,	
2008;	Blanchard	&	Perotti,	2002;	Cimadomo	&	Bénnasy-Quéré, 2012)	and	while	availability	
of	data	may	be	 the	reason,	 it	means	 that	our	understanding	of	 the	response	of	 fiscal	and	
monetary	variables	to	fiscal	policy	innovations	in	emerging	economies	is	 limited.	Secondly,	
the	 low	 incidence	 of	 domestic	 and	 external	 shocks	 as	 pertains	 to	 emerging	 economies	
(Abiad,	et	al.,	2012)	 implies	a	paucity	of	qualitative	evidence	on	the	response	of	fiscal	and	
monetary	variables	to	a	positive	government	spending	and	revenue	shock.	
										To	help	address	the	knowledge	gap,	I	studied	the	effect	of	a	fiscal	policy	shock	in	Brazil	
which	is	a	prototypical	and	prominent	emerging	economy.	I	chose	to	study	Brazil	firstly	for	
data	purposes	and	secondly	because	emerging	economies	–	especially	Brazil,	Russia,	 India	
and	China	 (BRIC)	 -	 are	 the	main	 drivers	 of	 global	 economic	 growth	 (Khanna,	 et	 al.,	 2005)	
whose	economic	development	are	likely	to	eclipse	most	of	the	current	rich	countries	in	the	
World	by	2050	(Goldman	Sachs,	2001).	In	fact	Jim	O’Neil	who	is	Chairman	of	Goldman	Sachs	
Asset	Management	estimates	that	BRIC	will	add	$13	trillion	to	their	collective	GDP	by	2020	
while	 Brazil	 alone	 adds	 $1	 trillion	 to	 her	 GDP	 in	 the	 same	 period	 ahead	 of	 advanced	
economies	 like	 Germany	 and	 the	 UK	 (University	 of	 Surrey	 School	 of	 Economics	 Alumni	
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Lecture,	 2012)	 thereby	 raising	 crucial	 economic	 policy	 questions	 linked	 to	 the	 global	
economic	impact	of	fiscal	and	monetary	policy	in	the	BRIC	(Goldman	Sachs,	2001)	especially	
in	 relation	 to	 the	 aggregate	 demand	 and	 subsequent	 economic	 growth	 effects	 of	 fiscal	
policy.	Thus,	 I	 assessed	 the	effect	of	 fiscal	policy	 shock	on	Brazil’s	economy.	Specifically,	 I	
assessed	the	impact	via	changes	in	Gross	Domestic	Product	(GDP)	and	via	the	behaviour	of	
inflation,	interest	rate	and	the	stock	price	index	after	the	fiscal	policy	innovation.	The	fiscal	
multiplier	which	 describes	 the	 change	 in	 GDP	 that	 is	 due	 to	 a	 change	 in	 spending	 or	 tax	
policy	was	also	looked	at.		
										I	found	that	for	a	linear	trend	analysis,	unlike	advanced	economies,	extra	government	
expenditure	was	 not	 expansionary	 but	 tax	 cuts	was	 expansionary.	 Revenues	 and	 interest	
rates	 rose	 after	 positive	 government	 expenditure	 shock	 for	 both	 a	 linear	 and	 quadratic	
trend	analysis.	And	the	later	causing	a	short	run	fall	in	inflation	after	policy	innovations	for	
both	a	linear	and	quadratic	trend	analysis.	For	the	financial	sector	of	Brazil’s	economy,	the	
stock	 price	 index	 as	 specified	 in	 the	 VAR	 model	 rose	 sharply	 in	 response	 to	 a	 positive	
government	expenditure	shock	but	falls	in	response	to	a	revenue	shock	for	both	linear	and	
quadratic	trend	analysis.	Overall,	unlike	the	pattern	seen	for	advanced	economies,	the	fiscal	
and	monetary	variables	are	highly	volatile	in	response	to	the	policy	innovations.		
										The	conclusion	is	that	the	opaque	nature	of	Brazil’s	economic	and	political	institutions	
implied	 that	 the	 transmission	 mechanism	 is	 weak	 offering	 an	 explanation	 for	 the	 high	
volatility	of	output,	 inflation,	 interest	 rate	and	stock	price	 index.	 In	 terms	of	 the	observed	
negative	 output,	 I	 concluded	 that	 expansionary	 fiscal	 policy	 that	 is	 not	 used	 for	
infrastructure	 projects,	 utility-generating	 economic	 activity	 or	 positive	 externalities	 takes	
resources	away	from	the	Brazilian	economy.	Literature	Review	Theoretical	Literature	
	
										Fiscal	 policy	 underscores	 the	 impact	 of	 government	 spending	 and	 taxation	 on	
aggregate	demand	against	the	backdrop	of	the	microeconomic	effects	of	resource	allocation	
and	 distribution	 (Allsopp	&	 Vines.,	 2005)	 including	 the	 provision	 of	 socioeconomic	 safety	
nets.	At	the	crux	of	fiscal	policy	is	economic	welfare	-	as	an	increase	in	government	spending	
increases	or	improves	public	goods	and	services	(discounting	the	cost	of	financing	a	deficit	if	
net	 tax	 receipts	 are	 less	 than	 government	 expenditure)	 while	 low	 taxes	 increases	 real	
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disposable	 incomes	 thus	 increasing	 the	 propensity	 to	 consume	 and	 inducing	 economic	
agents	to	decide	between	savings	and	 investment	or	both.	 Indeed	the	art	of	making	fiscal	
policy	with	 its	concomitant	 transmission	mechanisms	 is	crucial	 for	governments	as	voters,	
public	 institutions	 such	 as	 the	 central	 bank,	 investors	 and	 policymakers	 need	 the	 policy	
awareness	 in	 order	 to	 determine	whether	 the	 fiscal	 policy	 regime	 is	 effective	 enough	 to	
stimulate	 and	 sustain	 economic	 growth	both	 in	 the	 short	 and	 long	 run	without	 causing	 a	
fiscal	crisis	(Mauro,	et	al.,	2013).	
																			The	 two	 competing	 school	 of	 thoughts	 are	 that	 high	 fiscal	 deficits	 threaten	 to	
crowd	out	private	spending	and	significantly	undermine	market	confidence	as	interest	rates	
rise	(neoclassical	or	real	business	cycle	theory)	while	the	Keynesian	outlook	makes	a	strong	
case	 for	 the	 inoperability	 of	 fiscal	 contraction	 during	 a	 loss	 in	 economic	 output	 (as	 the	
proverbial	“green	shoots”	will	not	be	aided)	due	to	model	assumptions	that	both	prices	and	
wages	are	inflexible	(sticky)	and	aggregate	supply	curve	is	vertical	as	prices	adjusts	to	meet	
aggregate	 demand	 at	 full	 employment	 in	 an	open	 economy.	 The	 role	 of	 fiscal	 policy	 as	 a	
macroeconomic	 tool	 is	 even	more	 profound	 when	 the	 interest	 rate	 is	 at	 the	 lower	 zero	
bound	e.g.	 the	 current	US	Federal	Reserve	policy	 rate	 (The	Economist,	 2012).	At	 the	 zero	
bound	policy	 rate	 (Rn,t	≥0),	 the	central	banker	 is	unable	 to	stabilise	economic	output	and	
inflation	through	the	manipulation	of	interest	rate	(Cecchetti,	2000)	and	expansionary	fiscal	
policy	 therefore	 becomes	 an	 indispensable	 macroeconomic	 policy	 tool	 for	 the	 central	
government.	 In	 fact,	 recent	DSGE	 studies	 have	 emphasised	 that	 at	 the	 lower	 zero	 bound	
constraint,	economic	growth	is	largely	dependent	on	aggregate	demand	and	thus	all	policies	
should	be	geared	towards	stimulating	demand	in	the	short	run	as	spending	cuts	can	actually	
increase	budget	deficits	at	the	lower	bound	constraint	(Denes,	et	al.,	2013).	This	also	makes	
a	strong	case	for	tax	cuts	which	stimulate	demand	and	-	eventually	economic	growth	-	and	
also	increase	the	economic	welfare	of	the	poor.	In	fact	fiscal	policy	shock	can	be	an	increase	
in	government	expenditure	or	tax	cuts	(Jawadi,	et	al.,	2011).	Table	1:	The	Effects	of	a	Positive	Government	Spending	Shock	using	Theoretical	Models	
Theoretical	Framework							GDP								Interest	Rate										Inflation										Stock	Price	Index	
Neoclassical	RBC																							+																		+																															0																											+				
DSGE	Nominal	Frictions											+																	__																														+																										---		
DSGE	Deep	Habits																					+																	---																													----																								+	
Source:	Adapted	from	Fragetta	&	Melina,	2011	&	Jawadi,	et	al.,	2011.	
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Table	 1	 above	 summarises	 the	 expected	 qualitative	 results	 found	 in	 the	 theoretical	
literature	for	a	positive	government	spending	shock.	Empirical	Literature	
	
										The	VAR	literature	on	impact	of	fiscal	policy	shocks	have	generally	shown	that	positive	
government	spending	shocks	have	a	positive	impact	on	gross	domestic	product	and	positive	
tax	 shocks	 reduces	 economic	 growth	 (IS	 Curve	 shifts	 to	 the	 left)	while	 both	 tax	hikes	 and	
spending	 increases	 reduces	 private	 investment	 in	 the	 economy	 (Caldara	&	 Kamps.,	 2008;	
Blanchard	 &	 Perrotti.,	 2002).	 In	 fact,	 the	 said	 observation	 is	 irrespective	 of	 the	 type	 of	
identification	approach	used	(Caldara	&	Kamps,	2008)	and	is	consistent	with	both	Keynesian	
and	 neoclassical	 theories.	 Theoretically,	 expansionary	 fiscal	 policy	 either	 in	 the	 shape	 of	
spending	increase	or	tax	cut	pushes	 interest	rate	up	and	contractionary	fiscal	policy	 in	the	
form	of	spending	cuts	or	tax	hikes	forces	interest	rates	down	(Kirsanova,	et	al.,	2005;	Leith,	
et	 al.,	 2003)	 and	 this	 contrasts	with	 the	 empirical	 evidence	 from	Malik	 (2013)	wherein	 a	
positive	 spending	 shock	 brought	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 policy	 rate	 albeit	 Dynamic	 Stochastic	
General	 Equilibrium	 modelling	 was	 used.	 Furthermore,	 Chatziantoniou,	 et	 al.,	 (2013)	 in	
using	 the	 VAR	 framework	 elucidated	 that	 fiscal	 policy	 and	 interest	 rate	 were	 divergent	
mechanisms	and	the	findings	were	consistent	with	those	of	Sargent	&	Wallace	(1981)	and	
Melitz,	 (1997)	 albeit	 when	 convergent,	 fiscal	 policy	 and	 interest	 rate	 regimes	 shared	 the	
spoils	 in	controlling	 inflation	and	stabilising	economic	output.	Recently,	Dell’Erba	and	Sola	
(2013)	of	the	IMF’s	Fiscal	Affairs	Department	have	shown	that	general	movements	towards	
fiscal	consolidation	and	low	monetary	policy	rates	have	led	to	low	long	term	interest	rates	
and	low	sovereign	spreads	while	budgets	deficits	reverses	the	trend	in	advanced	economies.	
										A	 number	 of	 the	 economic	 literature	 has	 also	 focused	 on	 the	 role	 of	 a	 ballooning	
government	debt	on	stock	prices.	And	here,	the	approach	has	been	to	 look	at	what	effect	
temporary	changes	in	nominal	interest	rate	might	have	on	prices	when	the	fiscal	authorities	
do	not	aggressively	attempt	to	stabilise	the	debt	stock.	In	this	instance,	the	effect	of	a	fiscal	
policy	shock	on	the	stock	market	may	be	positive,	negative	or	even	negligible	depending	on	
whether	one	chooses	a	Keynsian,	Classical	and	Ricardian	(“tax	now	or	tax	later”)	approach	
respectively	
										The	 response	of	 the	 stock	market	 to	 a	 fiscal	 policy	 shock	 is	well	 documented	 in	 the	
economic	 literature.	 Indeed,	 the	 extensive	 literature	 also	 makes	 a	 distinction	 between	
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anticipated	 and	 unanticipated	 fiscal	 policy	 shocks	 and	 their	 respective	 transmission	
mechanisms.	 Darrat	 (1988)	who	 used	 a	 dynamic	 stochastic	 general	 equilibrium	modelling	
specifically	 found	 significant	 lagged	 effects	 of	 anticipated	 fiscal	 policy	 actions	 but	 found	
significantly	negative	impact	of	fiscal	deficits	on	stock	price	indices.	This	was	consistent	with	
the	 findings	of	Agnello	&	Sousa	 (2010)	who	used	a	panel	 vector	 autoregression	approach	
and	found	an	immediate	but	temporary	negative	response	of	stock	prices	to	a	fiscal	policy	
shock.	Moreover,	Afonso	and	Sousa	(2011)	in	employing	a	vector	autoregression	also	found	
government	 expenditure	 shock	 elicits	 a	 negative	 response	 from	 stock	 prices	 but	 revenue	
shocks	had	a	small	albeit	positive	impact	on	stock	price	indices.	While	Jansen,	et	al.	(2008)	
used	 a	 semiparametric	 analyses	 and	 argues	 that	 the	 effect	 of	 fiscal	 policy	 on	 stock	 price	
indices	depends	on	the	presence	of	other	macroeconomic	policy	tools	like	interest	rate.	
										Another	 school	 of	 thought	 has	 focused	 on	 the	 interactions	 between	 fiscal	 and	
monetary	policies	on	 the	 stock	price	 index.	This	 view	 takes	 into	account	 the	effect	of	 the	
said	policies	on	 the	output	gap	and	 inflation.	Specifically,	 it	 is	widely	believed	 that	on	 the	
fiscal	 side	 the	 interaction	occurs	 through	 the	effect	of	 fiscal	 policy	on	monetary	 variables	
such	 as	 inflation,	 interest	 rate	 and	 exchange	 rate	 while	 on	 the	 monetary	 side,	 it	 occurs	
through	the	government	 inter-temporal	budget	constraint	wherein	the	constraint	requires	
that	 the	 fiscal	 authority	 finances	 expenditure	 via	 taxation,	 borrowing	 or	 seignorage	
(Chatziantoniou,	 et	 al	 2013).	 Furthermore,	 Bernanke	 and	 Kuttner	 (2005)	 show	 that	 a	
hypothetical	unanticipated	25-basis-point	cut	 in	the	Federal	funds	rate	target	is	associated	
with	 about	 a	 1%	 increase	 in	 broad	 stock	 indexes.	 And	with	 an	 independent	 central	 bank	
employing	 a	 tight	monetary	 policy	 regime,	 it	 follows	 on	 that	 eventually	 inflation	 rises	 as	
deficit	financing	requires	an	increase	in	the	growth	rate	of	the	money	supply.	That	said,	it	is	
well	 known	 that	 asset	 prices	 are	 not	 supposed	 to	 stay	 constant	 in	 real	 terms	 during	 the	
business	cycle.	And	where	there	is	significant	appreciation,	 it	 is	generally	thought	that	this	
increase	in	asset	prices	reflect	real	economic	growth	and	a	comparable	growth	in	earnings	
or	 the	 expected	 return	 on	 assets	 in	 equilibrium.	 However,	 when	 adjusted	 for	 inflation,	
nominal	 and	 real	 economic	 growth,	 Fatas	 and	Mihov	 (2013)	 in	 excluding	 factors	 such	 as	
interest	 rate,	 expected	 earnings	 growth	 and	 risk	 appetite	 for	 example	 elucidate	 that	 the	
record	high	 levels	of	stock	price	 indices	 recorded	post	2009	 financial	crisis	 recovery	 is	not	
extraordinary	as	they	are	comparably	low	to	the	prices	seen	in	the	1990s	financial	bubble.	
On	 the	 bond	 markets	 however,	 deficit	 financed	 expansionary	 fiscal	 policy	 could	 signal	
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markets	 to	 weigh	 the	 probability	 that	 a	 government	 default	 could	 rob	 investors	 of	 the	
expected	 earnings	 on	 their	 loans	 as	 ceteris	 paribus	 a	 higher	 debt	 burden	 translates	 into	
higher	risk	of	default	and	this	risk	 is	higher	when	the	current	account	deficit	 is	 larger.	The	
resultant	downgrade	of	a	government	debt	brings	new	information	onto	the	stock	market	
and	 may	 affect	 the	 way	 investors	 behave.	 From	 the	 literature	 review,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	
conclude	that	expansionary	fiscal	policy	induces	a	negative	reaction	from	the	stock	market.	
										The	transmission	mechanism	of	a	fiscal	policy	shock	via	inflation	is	well	documented	in	
the	 academic	 literature.	 In	 essence,	 increases	 in	 nominal	 public	 debt	 in	 the	 absence	 of	
expected	 increases	 in	 taxes	 or	 the	 price	 level	 leaves	 economic	 agents	 with	 nominal	
disposable	 incomes	 until	 increases	 in	 the	 price	 level	 erode	 their	 wealth,	 inducing	 these	
agents	to	scale	back	their	spending.	The	preceding	behavioural	mechanism	implies	that	an	
interest	rate	hike	flows	directly	through	increased	nominal	government	spending.	And	in	the	
neoclassical	model	wherein	prices	are	deemed	to	fully	flexible,	the	central	banker	loses	their	
authority	 to	 affect	 the	 price	 level	 as	 interest	 rate	 hikes	 means	 that	 government	 debt	
increases	and	this	has	the	potential	of	reducing	economic	welfare	as	interest	rate	payment	
is	a	major	part	of	government	spending.	However	in	a	new	Keynesian	model	with	assumed	
price	stickiness,	the	central	banker	maintains	the	ability	to	generate	a	recession	or	speed	up	
economic	growth	albeit	 it	 loses	trend	inflation.	Duarte	and	Wolman,	(2008)	 in	using	a	two	
region	 general	 equilibrium	model	 with	 traded	 and	 non-traded	 goods	 (for	 a	 country	 in	 a	
monetary	union)	 found	that	 lowering	 income	tax	rate	 in	response	to	 inflation	differentials	
translated	 into	 suppressed	 inflation	 differentials	 leading	 to	 a	 higher	 volatility	 in	 domestic	
inflation	while	leaving	the	volatility	of	real	economic	growth	roughly	unchanged.	In	addition,	
where	this	output	volatility	induces	a	“Nash	game”	style	conflict	over	the	size	of	the	output	
gap,	then	the	policymaker	can	expect	interest	and	exchange	rate	volatility	(Leitemo,	2004).	
It	 is	well	 known	 in	 theoretical	economics	 that	persistent	 fiscal	deficits	are	 inflationary	but	
showing	this	to	be	true	empirically	has	not	always	been	easy	or	straightforward	except	for	
Catao	 and	 Terrones	 (2005)	 wherein	 a	 very	 large	 dataset	 was	 used	 and	 inflation	 was	
modelled	 as	 non-linearly	 related	 to	 fiscal	 deficits	 through	 the	 inflation	 tax	 base	 and	
estimation	 was	 then	 carried	 out	 under	 the	 assumption	 of	 a	 dynamically	 intrinsic	
relationship.		
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										I	use	quarterly	data	from	the	period	1997Q1	to	2008Q4	giving	𝜂	=	48	observations	for	
baseline	variables	for	Brazil	 i.e.	government	expenditure	(government	expenditure	+	Gross	
Investment)	(EXPEND),	Gross	Domestic	Product	(GDP),	Inflation	(INF),	government	revenue	
(REV)	and	 interest	rate	(INT)	and	for	the	stock	price	 index	(STOCKPIX).	The	components	of	
national	 income	 and	 fiscal	 series	 including	 the	 stock	 price	 index	 are	 all	 in	 real	 terms	 at	
source.	I	restrict	the	estimation	of	national	income	and	fiscal	series	to	the	period	up	to	the	
last	quarter	of	2008	as	afterwards	the	data	series	is	likely	to	have	been	affected	by	the	2009	
global	financial	crises	and	the	resultant	market	mayhem	could	lead	to	higher	multipliers	due	
to	 large	output	gaps.	The	 real	 stock	price	 index	 (Stockpix)	data	was	 in	monthly	series	and	
this	 was	 aggregated	 using	 arithmetic	 mean.	 Data	 on	 gross	 government	 expenditure	 and	
gross	investment	were	added	up	and	divided	by	2	for	each	series	pair	to	obtain	total	gross	
government	expenditure	(government	expenditure	+	government	investment).		
										I	 decided	 to	 use	 the	 GDP	 deflator	 which	 is	 an	 economic	 metric	 which	 gives	 a	
satisfactory	record	and	explanation	of	 inflation	 (price	rising	to	keep	up	with	the	 increased	
cost	of	production	which	 leads	 to	a	 fall	 in	 the	purchasing	power	of	money)	by	converting	
output	measured	at	current	prices	to	constant	dollar	GDP.	The	GDP	deflator	is	preferred	to	
the	 Consumer	 Price	 Index	 (CPI,	 based	 on	 a	 representative	 fixed	 basket	 of	 goods)	 in	 this	
study	 as	 it	 shows	how	much	 a	 change	 in	 the	base	 year’s	GDP	 relies	 upon	 changes	 in	 the	
price	level.	It	also	captures	changes	in	consumption	patterns	or	the	addition	of	new	goods	
and	services	to	the	macroeconomy.	And	the	importance	of	this	choice	is	underscored	by	the	
fact	that	Brazil	is	an	emerging	market	and	likely	to	have	a	relatively	higher	number	of	new	
services	and	products	being	introduced	into	the	economy.	
										In	addition,	I	transformed	the	components	of	the	fiscal	series	and	national	income	into	
their	natural	logarithm	form	with	the	aim	of	stabilising	the	variance	of	the	fiscal	series	(see	
Lütkepohl	&	Krätzig,	2004)	and	reducing	heteroscedasticity.	The	gdp	deflator	(inflation)	and	
interest	rate	series	were	not	transformed	into	their	logarithmic	format.	Furthermore,	gross	
domestic	 product	 is	 in	 constant	 prices	 and	 percent	 change,	 government	 expenditure,	
government	investment	and	tax	revenue	is	in	percent	of	GDP	while	gross	domestic	product	
deflator	 (inflation)	 is	 in	 index	 form.	 I	 sourced	 the	 data	 on	 gross	 domestic	 product,	
government	expenditure	and	investment,	tax	revenue,	and	gross	domestic	product	deflator	
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(Inflation)	 from	 the	 International	Monetary	 Fund	World	Economic	Outlook	Database	April	
2013	and	the	data	on	real	interest	rate	is	sourced	from	The	World	Bank	Open	Data	website.	
I	 sourced	 the	 data	 on	 real	 stock	 price	 index	 from	 Yahoo	 Finance.	 I	 use	 Eviews	 6	 Student	
version	to	estimate	the	Recursive	Approach.	
	 Econometric	Methodology	
	
										It	 is	well	 known	 that	 time	 series	data	exhibit	 a	 variety	of	 behaviour.	 Thus,	 there	 are	
several	steps	to	be	addressed	before	estimation	of	the	VARs	and	it	 is	noteworthy	that	the	
steps	 I	 describe	 here	 are	 not	 exhaustive.	 The	 first	 of	 these	 is	 the	 determination	 of	 the	
stationarity	or	non-stationarity	of	variables	via	unit	root	tests	and	tests	for	first	difference	if	
variables	are	found	to	be	non-stationary	(Augmented	Dickey-Fuller	tests).		The	second	is	the	
test	of	cointegration	for	non-stationary	variables	that	have	to	be	first	differenced	to	reach	
stationarity	 i.e.	 integrated	 of	 order	 1	 I	 (1).	 	 Then	 there	 are	 other	 equally	 important	
considerations	 too	and	these	 include	the	optimal	number	of	 lags	 to	be	employed	and	the	
de-trending	methods	 to	 be	 used	which	 to	 a	 large	 extent	 could	 account	 for	 the	 different	
qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 results	 found	 in	 the	 VAR	 literature	 on	 effect	 of	 fiscal	 policy	
shocks	(Caldara	&	Kamps,	2008)	
										Economic	 theory	 informs	 the	 selection	 of	 variables	 while	 multivariate	 information	
criteria	 informs	 the	 selection	 of	 optimal	 lag.	 An	 extensive	 review	 of	 the	 VAR	 literature	
elucidates	 three	multivariate	 information	 criteria	namely	 the	Akaike	 Information	Criterion	
(AIC),	Schwarz	Criterion	(SC)	and	Hannan-Quinn	Criterion	(HQC).	From	the	data	used	for	this	
study,	I	provide	the	values	for	AIC,	SC	and	HQC	in	the	table	below	adapted	from	the	Eviews	
output.	 Table	2:	VAR	Lag	Order	Selection	Criteria	
Lag															Akaike	Information	Criterion				Schwarz	criterion			Hannan-Quinn	criterion	
					1																-29.31																																												-27.59																							-28.67	
					2																-28.24																																												-25.05																							-27.06	
					3																-28.16																																												-23.49																							-26.43	
					4																-38.33																																												-32.18																							-36.06	
					5																-42.46*																																									-34.84*																					-39.65*	
*	indicates	lag	order	selected	by	the	criterion	in	Eviews	6	Student	Version	
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As	can	be	seen	from	the	table	above	the	optimal	lag	for	my	dataset	is	5	but	since	a	review	
the	VAR	literature	(Burriel,	et	al.,	2010;	Caldara	&	Kamps,	2002;	Blanchard	&	Perotti,	2002)	
shows	a	strong	preference	for	4	lags	and	the	relatively	small	number	of	observations	(48)	I	
choose	 the	 latter	 with	 the	 added	 benefit	 of	 avoiding	 over-fitting	 as	 adding	 more	 lags	
improves	 the	 fit	 but	 reduces	 the	 degrees	 of	 freedoms	 and	 increases	 the	 danger	 of	 over-
fitting.	 And	 this	 is	 how	 the	 AIC	 and	 SC	 works	 as	 they	 are	 the	measures	 of	 the	 trade-off	
between	fit	and	loss	of	degrees	of	freedom	so	that	the	chosen	lag	 length	should	minimise	
both	AIC	and	SC.		
										All	 five	baseline	variables	namely	EXPEND	GDP	 INF	REV	 INT	were	 found	 to	be	non	–
stationary	 except	 STOCKPIX	 and	had	 to	be	 first	 differenced	 to	 achieve	 stationarity.	 I	 then	
tested	all	 five	baseline	variables	plus	STOCKPIX	for	cointegration	(spurious	regression)	and	
rejected	the	null	hypothesis	of	no	cointegration	and	the	Eviews	values	can	be	found	in	the	
tables	below.	I	then	proceed	to	prefer	the	Vector	Error	Correction	Model	and	thus	choose	a	
rank	 (number	of	cointegrating	equations)	of	1(one)	 in	Eviews	when	prompted	as	 this	 is	 in	
reference	to	the	first	difference	terms	in	the	Vector	Error	Correction.	
	 Table	3:	Unit	Root	and	First	Difference	Tests	of	Stationarity	
																																										ADF	Level	&	Intercept																												ADF	∆	First	Difference	
																		t-Statistic					Probability				Critical	Values								t-Statistic			Probability	Critical	Values	
EXPEND				-1.35												5%	level								-2.93																									-6.71										5%	level						-1.95	
GDP										-2.20													5%	level								-2.93																									-6.71										5%	level					-1.95	
INF												-0.34													5%	level								-2.93																									-6.71										5%	level					-1.95	
REV											-1.82													5%	level								-2.93																									-6.71										5%	level					-1.95	
INT												-0.98													5%	level								-2.93																									-6.71										5%	level					-1.95	
STOCKPIX	-4.58													5%	level								-2.93	
	
	 Table	4:	Tests	for	Cointegration	
Variable																				t-Statistic											5%	Critical	Value(Eviews)								Probability	
E(-1)																										-2.88																				1.68																																												0.00	∆E(-1)																								1.73																					1.68																																												0.23	
	
P a g e 	|	12	
	 Figure	1:	Stationarity	of	Variables	of	Interest	
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Figure	1	 is	a	graphical	 representation	of	the	behaviour	of	both	fiscal	and	monetary	series.	
Indeed,	 inflation	 is	 “trending”	 and	expenditure,	 gross	domestic	 product,	 interest	 rate	 and	
revenue	 (below)	 are	 “wandering	 about	 a	 trend”.	 In	 addition,	 the	 series	 for	 the	 real	 stock	
price	 index	are	fluctuating	around	a	constant.	The	behaviour	of	the	variables	of	 interest	 is	
consistent	 with	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 tests	 for	 stationarity	 and	 non-stationarity	 as	 non-
stationary	 series	 display	 wandering	 behaviour	 around	 a	 trend	 and	 or	 constant	 while	
stationary	series	display	fluctuating	behaviour	around	a	trend	and	or	constant	(Lütkepohl	&	
Krätzig,	2004)	as	can	be	seen	from	the	stockpix	series	which	was	found	to	be	stationary.		Recursive	Approach	
	
										A	 detailed	 review	 of	 recent	 academic	 literature	 on	 assessing	 fiscal	 policy	 shocks	
delineates	 Vector	 Autoregressive	Models	 (VAR)	 as	 the	main	 econometric	 tools	 that	 have	
been	 used	 (Blanchard	 &	 Perotti,	 2002;	 Cimadomo	 &	 Bénassy-Quéré.,	 2012;	 Caldara	 &	
Kamps.,	 2008;	 Jawadi,	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 Burriel,	 et	 al.,	 2010).	 In	 a	 simplified	 form,	 VAR	 is	 a	
statistical	 model	 that	 is	 used	 to	 capture	 linear	 interdependencies	 among	 multiple	 time	
series.	 The	 VAR	 literature	 delineates	 four	 different	 identification	 approaches.	 Specifically,	
these	are	the	recursive	approach,	Blanchard	Perotti	approach	(Blanchard	&	Perotti,	2002),	
event	study	approach	(Ramey	&	Shapiro,	1998)	and	sign	restrictions	approach	(Mountford	&	
Uhlig,	2005).	 I	will	 focus	on	 the	 recursive	approach.	 Its	 imperative	 to	note	 that	a	detailed	
review	of	the	VAR	literature	on	fiscal	policy	shocks	have	shown	that	due	to	the	employment	
of	 different	 identification	 approaches,	 variables	 of	 interest,	 	 detrending	 methods	 (first	
difference,	 linear,	 quadratic	 and	 Hodrick-Prescott	 Filter),	 sample	 periods	 and	 number	 of	
lags,	 the	 empirical	 results	 have	 been	 somewhat	 different	 and	 sometimes	 difficult	 to	
compare.	 Thus	 I	 briefly	 describe	 the	 qualitative	 effects	 of	 positive	 government	 spending	
shock	in	the	table	below.	
	 Table	5:	The	Qualitative	Effects	of	a	Positive	Government	Shock	using	Empirical	Models	
Empirical	Models								GDP														Interest	Rate													Inflation									Stock	Price	Index	
Recursive																											+																						+																																		---																											--	
Blanchard-Perotti												+																						--																																			+																												--																																			
Event	Study																							+																					--																																			--																												--	
Sign	Restrictions															+																					---																																		+																											--	
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Source:	Adapted	from	Fragetta	&	Melina,	2011	&	Jawadi,	et	al.,	2011.		
	
									The	 macroeconomic	 impact	 of	 fiscal	 and	 monetary	 policy	 shock	 will	 be	 assessed	 using	 the	
Bayesian	 Structural	 Vector	 Auto-regression	 (BSVAR)	 and	 an	 estimate	 will	 be	 calculated	 in	 the	
following	manner	
Г(L)	Xt	=	Г0	Xt	=	Г1	+	Xt-1	+	…=	c	+	ԑt																(1)	
																			Vt	=	Г0-1	ԑt,																																						(2)	
Г(L)	is	an	nxn	matrix	and	Xt	is	an	nx1	matrix	
Where	ԑt	|	Xs	,	S	<	t	~	N(0,Ʌ),	Г(L)	is	a	matrix	valued	polynomial	in	positive	powers	of	the	lag	
operator	L,	n	is	the	number	of	variables	in	the	system	and	ԑt	are	the	fundamental	economic	
shocks	that	span	the	space	of	innovations	to	Xt	and	Vt	is	the	VAR	innovation.	
					Fiscal	policy	can	then	be	characterised	as		
																			git	=	f	(Ωt)	+	ԑti																										(3)	
where	 git	 is	 the	 fiscal	 policy	 instrument,	 f	 is	 a	 linear	 function,	 (Ωt)	 is	 the	 information	 set	
available	to	the	government	at	the	time	of	setting	the	policy	and	ԑti	is	the	shock.	
A	recursive	identification	scheme	is	then	considered	and	consistent	with	Jawadi,	et	al.,	2011,	
an	 assumption	 is	made	of	 the	 variables	 in	Xt.	 Specifically,	 (i)	 a	 subset	of	 n1	 variables,	 X1t,	
which	 do	 not	 respond	 contemporaneously	 to	 the	 fiscal	 policy	 shock;	 (ii)	 a	 subset	 of	 n2	
variables,	X2t,	 that	 respond	contemporaneously	 to	 it;	and	 (iii)	 the	policy	 instrument	 in	 the	
form	 of	 the	 government	 spending,	 gt,	 or	 government	 revenue,	 tt.	 Thus,	 for	 the	 set	 of	
variables	 belonging	 to	 X1t,	 GDP,	 interest	 rate	 and	 inflation	 are	 added	 (Christiano,	 et	 al.,	
2005)	and	the	stock	price	index	to	X2t	set	of	variables.		
										The	 principle	 behind	 a	 recursive	 identification	 is	 that	 the	 error	 terms	 in	 each	
regression	is	formed	under	the	assumption	that	they	are	uncorrelated	to	the	error	terms	of	
the	 preceding	 equation.	 And	 this	 can	 be	 achieved	 by	 the	 inclusion	 of	 some	
contemporaneous	values	as	 regressors.	Thus,	 for	my	 four	variables	of	 interest	 i.e.	output,	
inflation,	 interest	 rate	 and	 stock	 price	 index,	 the	 first	 equation	 consists	 of	 output	 as	 the	
dependent	variable	followed	by	lagged	values	of	all	four	variables	as	regressors.	The	second	
equation	then	consists	of	inflation	as	the	dependent	variable	followed	by	lagged	values	of	all	
four	variables	plus	the	current	value	of	output.	The	third	equation	then	consists	of	interest	
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rate	 as	 the	 dependent	 variable	 followed	 by	 lagged	 values	 of	 all	 four	 variables	 plus	 the	
current	value	of	output	and	inflation	and	the	fourth	equation	will	be	composed	of	the	stock	
price	index	as	the	dependent	variable	followed	by	lagged	values	of	all	four	variables	plus	the	
current	values	of	output,	inflation	and	interest	rate.	
							Contemporaneous	 assumptions	 are	made	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 are	 “k”	 possible	
ordering	 of	 the	 variables	 of	 interest	 in	 total	 and	 changing	 the	 order	 affects	 the	 results	
gained.	 Thus,	 the	 order	 is	 government	 expenditure,	 output,	 inflation,	 tax	 revenue	 and	
interest	 rate	 respectively	 with	 expenditure	 and	 revenue	 serving	 as	 the	 economic	 policy	
instruments.	 Ordering	 is	 primarily	 due	 to	 theoretical	 contemporaneous	 assumptions	 that	
movements	 in	 government	 expenditure,	 unlike	movements	 in	 net	 tax	 receipts	 are	 largely	
unrelated	 to	 the	 real	 business	 cycle.	 This	 means	 that	 output	 and	 inflation	 are	 ordered	
before	 taxes	 as	 the	 aforesaid	 affect	 taxes.	 Interest	 rate	 is	 then	ordered	 last	 and	ordering	
interest	rate	last	can	be	justified	on	the	grounds	of	a	central	banker’s	Stackelberg	reaction	
function	–	where	the	central	government	is	the	Stackelberg	leader	–	(see	Kirsanova,	et	al.,	
2005)	thus	 implying	that	 interest	rate	 is	set	as	a	 function	of	output	gap	and	 inflation	with	
revenue	and	expenditure	devoid	of	 interest	payments.	 In	 fact,	 the	ordering	helps	 capture	
the	effects	of	the	automatic	stabilisers	which	are	economic	policies	and	programs	that	are	
designed	 to	 offset	 fluctuations	 in	 the	 macro-economy	 albeit	 without	 intervention	 from	
central	 government	 or	 policy	 makers.	 And	 automatic	 stabilisers	 come	 in	 the	 form	 of	
personal	and	corporate	taxes,	unemployment	insurance/benefits	and	welfare.	
										Based	 on	 the	 contemporaneous	 assumptions,	 I	 order	 EXPEND	 (Government	
expenditure	+	Gross	Investment)	→	GDP	(Gross	Domestic	Product)		→	INF	(Inflation)	→	REV	
(Government	Revenue)	→	INT	(Real	Interest	Rate)	→	STOCKPIX	(Stock	Price	Index).	And	this	
means	that	equation	2	above	takes	the	following	matrix	form:	
											1 0 0 0 0𝑔𝑑𝑝/𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑 1 0 0 0𝑖𝑛𝑓/𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑓/𝑔𝑑𝑝 1 0 0𝑟𝑒𝑣/𝑒𝑥𝑝 𝑟𝑒𝑣/𝑔𝑑𝑝 𝑟𝑒𝑣/𝑖𝑛𝑓 1 0𝑖𝑛𝑡/𝑒𝑥𝑝 𝑖𝑛𝑡/𝑔𝑑𝑝 𝑖𝑛𝑡/𝑖𝑛𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑡/𝑟𝑒𝑣 1
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑡 ԑt	=	
1 0 0 0 00 1 0 0 00 0 1 0 00 0 0 1 00 0 0 0 1
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑡 	vt	
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	 Empirical	Results	
	
										In	this	section,	I	interpret	the	findings	of	the	recursive	approach.	I	preferred	the	Vector	
Error	Correction	Model	(VECM)	to	the	unrestricted	vector	autoregression	model	(VAR)	as	all	
but	one	variable	became	stationary	after	first	differencing	and	all	were	subsequently	found	
to	be	co-integrated	of	order	I(1).	I	also	describe	the	estimates	of	the	elasticities	prevalent	in	
the	structural	VAR	identification	scheme	for	Brazil	below	as	this	will	help	explain	the	effects	
of	a	government	spending	and	revenue	shock.	Table	6:	Elasticities	of	Government	Spending	and	Revenue	Shock	
																																			Elasticities	of	Government	Spending															Elasticities	of	Government	Revenue	
																																			𝜉G,Y									𝜉G,𝜋									𝜉G,i																																						𝜉T,Y													𝜉T,	𝜋									𝜉T,i		
Brazil																									0																-0.5											0																																											1.85													1.25										0	
Sourced	from	Blanchard	&	Perotti,	2002	and	also	cited	in	Jawadi,	et	al	2011.	
	 Effects	of	a	Positive	Government	Spending	Shock	Recursive	Approach	Linear	Trend	VECM	
	
										For	 the	 VECM,	 I	 tested	 for	 both	 a	 linear	 trend	 and	 a	 quadratic	 trend	 for	 Brazil’s	
economy.	 For	 a	 linear	 trend;	 In	 response	 to	 a	 1%	 positive	 shock	 in	 expenditure,	 output	
(GDP)	fall	below	the	steady	state	and	rises	to	the	reach	the	steady	state	in	the	4th	quarter	
overshooting	the	steady	state	in	the	4th	quarter	and	returning	to	the	steady	state	in	the	5th	
quarter.	 Meanwhile,	 inflation	 falls	 after	 a	 government	 expenditure	 shock	 and	 fluctuates	
below	the	steady	state	while	revenue	increases	as	the	government	needs	to	recoup	some	of	
the	money	spent	on	the	economy.	However,	interest	rates	rise	above	the	steady	state	as	a	
rise	 in	expenditure	crowds	out	 investment	spending	and	shifting	the	IS	curve	to	the	left	 in	
the	 process.	 The	 stock	 price	 index	 which	 represents	 Brazil’s	 financial	 sector	 in	 the	 SVAR	
model	 used	 fluctuate	 sharply	 above	 the	 steady	 state	 in	 response	 to	 a	 1%	 government	
spending	 shock.	 Essentially	 the	 BOVESPA	 (stock	 price	 index)	 rises	 as	 the	 money	 supply	
increases	as	result	of	a	rise	 in	government	expenditure	and	the	shock	persists	 throughout	
the	20	quarter	horizon	used	in	this	study.	However	the	rise	is	not	sustained	over	the	horizon	
and	appears	to	fall	toward	to	steady	state.	
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	 Quadratic	Trend	VECM	
	
										I	 then	 turn	 my	 attention	 to	 the	 impulse	 response	 functions	 for	 a	 quadratic	 trend	
VECM.	As	can	be	seen	from	the	IRFs	from	figure	3,	output	falls	 in	response	to	a	1%	rise	in	
government	expenditure	and	returns	and	overshoots	the	steady	state.	That	said,	unlike	the	
behaviour	 seen	 for	 the	 linear	 trend	VECM	analyses,	 output	 remains	 and	 fluctuates	 above	
the	 steady	 after	 overshooting	 it	while	 inflation	 remains	 below	 the	 steady	 state	 until	 18th	
quarter	when	it	begins	to	rise	but	interest	rate	reacts	quickly	to	the	expenditure	shock	but	
falls	 and	 remains	 below	 the	 steady	 state	 after	 4	 quarters	 in	 line	 with	 the	 behaviour	 of	
inflation.	 Furthermore,	 in	 response	 to	 a	 1%	 government	 expenditure	 shock,	 Brazil’s	
BOVESPA	rises	and	fluctuate	above	the	steady	state	as	the	market	rises	to	an	increase	in	the	
money	supply.	 Effects	of	a	Positive	Revenue	Shock	Linear	Trend	VECM	
	
										From	Figure	2,	 it	 can	be	seen	 that	output	 (GDP)	 rises	and	 remains	above	 the	steady	
state	 for	 the	 20	 quarter	 horizon	 in	 response	 to	 a	 1%	 cut	 in	 taxes	 as	 spending	 patterns	
increase	 due	 to	 a	 rise	 in	 the	 marginal	 propensity	 to	 consume.	 But	 Brazilian	 consumers	
expect	 taxes	 to	 rise	 in	 the	 future	 or	 the	 tax	 cut	 to	 be	 followed	 by	 a	 spending	 cut	 from	
Brasilia	 so	 there	 is	 no	 permanent	 demand	 shock	 and	 thus	 as	 is	 evident	 from	 the	 IRFs	 in	
figure	2,	inflation	falls	and	remains	below	the	steady	state	throughout	the	time	horizon	for	
this	study.	In	the	same	vein,	interest	rate	rise	in	the	short	run	but	this	could	be	due	to	fact	
that	the	central	bank	uses	the	Taylor	Principle	to	raise	the	real	interest	rate	keeping	inflation	
low	 in	 the	 process	 and	 helping	 postpone	 aggregate	 consumption.	 However	 the	 BOVESPA	
reacts	negatively	to	a	1%	tax	cut	as	it	falls	below	the	steady	state	but	rise	above	the	steady	
state	 in	 the	 2nd	 quarter	 and	 indeed	 the	 fluctuating	 pattern	 around	 the	 steady	 state	
continues	 throughout	 the	 forecasting	 horizon.	 This	 could	 be	 due	 to	 weak	 transmission	
mechanisms	in	the	economy	which	I	will	elaborate	on	in	the	discussion	section	of	this	paper.	Quadratic	Trend	VECM	
	
										The	 IRFs	 for	 the	quadratic	 trend	are	 similar	 to	 those	of	 the	 linear	 trend	VECM	 for	 a	
positive	 revenue	 shock.	 For	 instance	 in	 response	 to	 a	 1%	 tax	 cut,	 output	 rises	 as	 the	
marginal	 propensity	 to	 consume	 increase	 from	 the	disposal	 income	and	 indeed	Brazilians	
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may	expect	future	tax	hikes	or	spending	cuts	and	thus	induce	them	to	save	instead	of	spend	
their	 disposal	 incomes	 on	 goods	 and	 services	 and	 thus	 the	 tax	 cut	 does	 not	 cause	 a	
permanent	demand	shock	and	inflation	falls	below	the	steady	state		and	this	fall	in	inflation	
could	have	been	necessitated	the	fact	the	central	bank	uses	the	Taylor	Principle	to	increase	
short	 term	 interest	 rate	 causing	 a	 reduction	 in	 the	 money	 supply	 and	 subsequent	
postponement	of	aggregate	consumption.	And	as	seen	the	in	previous	section,	the	BOVESPA	
reacts	negatively	 to	a	 revenue	shock	even	 though	economic	 theory	 suggests	 that	 tax	cuts	
information	causes	stock	price	 indices	to	rise	as	 investors	expect	to	pay	less	tax	on	capital	
gains	and	dividends.	Figure	2:	IRFs	of	Linear	Trend	VECM	for	Recursive	Approach	
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	 Figure	3:	IRFs	of	Quadratic	Trend	VECM	for	Recursive	Approach	
	Table	7:	Impulse	Response	to	Positive	Government	Expenditure	Shock	
Linear	Trend																			Impact	Effect		1	Year				2	Years			3		Years			4	Years			5	Years						Peak	
Expenditure																				0.01																			0.01							0.02								0.02								0.02									0.02							0.02(18)					
GDP																																	-0.06																		0.00						-0.02							-0.06							-0.03								-0.06								0.01(6)	
Inflation																									-0.01																	-0.02						-0.03							-0.03								-0.02								-0.03				-0.01(18)																															
Revenue																									0.004																	0.003				0.001						0.003							0.004						0.003			0.004(14)	
Interest	Rate																		0.008																0.000			-0.001						0.003							0.003							0.005				0.008(1)	
Stock	Price	Index											0.09																		0.04								0.02							0.03									0.02									0.02							0.07(6)	
Values	in	()	indicates	peak	quarter.	
	
Quadratic	Trend											Impact	Year					1	Year		2	Years		3	Years			4	Years		5	Years								Peak	
Expenditure																		0.012																	0.001					0.002					0.006						0.005					0.005						0.012(1)	
GDP																																-0.07																		0.06							0.03								0.00								0.01							0.00									0.03(8)	
Inflation																									0.000															-0.001				-0.002				-0.002				-0.001					-0.001					0.000(18)	
Revenue																								0.003																	0.000				-0.001						0.001				0.000							0.000					0.000(1)	
Interest	Rate																	0.008																-0.002			-0.005					-0.004			-0.003					-0.002					0.008(1)	
Stock	Price	Index										0.10																				0.05							0.06								0.06							0.05								0.06							0.11(7)	
Values	in	()	indicates	peak	quarter	
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	 Table	8:	Impulse	Response	to	Positive	Revenue	Shock	
Linear	Trend																				Impact	Year			1	Year		2	Years			3	Years		4	Years			5	Years					Peak	
Expenditure																								0.00																				0.00							-0.01								-0.01							-0.01								-0.01											0.00(1)	
GDP																																						0.00																				0.00							0.04										0.04									0.07									0.05											0.07(16)	
Inflation																														0.000																		0.000				0.000								-0.001					-0.001						-0.001								0.000(4)	
Revenue																													0.001																		0.001					-0.002						-0.001					-0.001						-0.001								0.001(4)	
Interest	Rate																					0.005																		0.003					-0.001							-0.003				-0.004						-0.003								0.005(1)	
Stock	Price	Index														-0.04																			0.02								-0.01											0.01							0.00									-0.01									0.02(2)	
Values	in	()	indicate	peak	quarter	
	
Quadratic	Trend													Impact	Year								1	Year				2	Years					3	Years				4	Years					5	Years							Peak	
Expenditure																				0.000																				0.000					-0.003							-0.002						-0.001						0.000									0.000(1)	
GDP																																		0.00																							0.01								0.04											0.02										0.05								0.03											0.06(14)	
Inflation																											0.000																				0.000					-0.001							-0.001						-0.001						-0.001							0.000(4)	
Revenue																										0.001																				0.001						-0.001								0.000						-0.001							0.000								0.001(1)	
Interest	Rate																		0.005																				0.003						-0.002							-0.003						-0.003						-0.002							0.005(1)																		
Stock	Price	Index											-0.04																					0.02									-0.02										0.00								-0.01									-0.01									0.02(2)	
	Values	in	()	indicate	peak	quarter	 	De-trending	Methods	
	
										De-trending	methods	essentially	help	pre-process	time	series	for	analyses	that	assume	
stationarity	 of	 variables.	 In	 the	 light	 of	 this,	 I	 found	 serial	 autocorrelation	 amongst	 all	 six	
variables	i.e.	expenditure,	gross	domestic	product,	inflation,	revenue,	interest	rate	and	stock	
price	index.		I	used	the	Breusch-Godfrey	Lagrange	Multiplier	test	and	the	null	hypothesis	is	
that	there	is	no	serial	autocorrelation	up	to	𝜌	lags.	In	fact	for	the	4	lags	chosen	for	this	study	
the	 𝜌	 value	 is	 0.00	 which	 is	 significant.	 Furthermore,	 I	 tested	 all	 six	 variables	 for	 non-
normality	using	Lutkepohl’s	Cholesky	of	covariance	as	the	orthogonalization	method	and	the	
null	 hypothesis	 of	 normal	 distribution	 (residuals	 are	 multivariate	 normal)	 based	 on	 the	
skewness	and	kurtosis	of	the	standardised	residuals	is	accepted.		
										The	 portmanteau	 test	 for	 residual	 correlation	 is	 usually	 employed	 to	 test	 the	 null	
hypothesis	of	no	remaining	residual	autocorrelation	at	𝜌	lags	but	this	is	essentially	used	for	
larger	 order	 VARs	 (Lütkepohl	 &	 Krätzig,	 2004)	 so	 I	 refrain	 from	 testing	 this	 on	 my	 six	
variables	of	interest.		
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	 How	are	Results	Different	from	those	of	a	Prototypical	Advanced	Economy	like	USA	
	
										There	are	several	observable	differences	 in	the	behaviour	of	the	fiscal	and	monetary	
variables	in	this	study	after	the	policy	innovations	especially	when	I	consider	the	outcomes	
of	studies	using	the	VAR	framework	based	on	an	advanced	and	open	economy	like	the	USA.	
Since	the	ordering	of	variables	is	important	and	in	fact	affects	the	results	in	a	VAR,	I	restrict	
my	comparisons	to	studies	 that	have	used	the	same	variables	and	subsequently	 the	same	
ordering	 to	 study	 the	 impact	 of	 fiscal	 policy	 shock	 on	 an	 advanced	 economy.	 That	 said,	 I	
could	not	find	any	study	that	had	a	similar	sample	period	of	𝜂	=48	observations.		
										In	an	empirical	assessment	of	fiscal	policy	shocks	in	the	Euro	Area	and	USA,	Burriel,	et	
al.,	 2010	 found	 that	 output	multipliers	 for	 a	 1%	 rise	 in	 US	 government	 expenditure	 was	
about	 0.76	 on	 impact	 and	 increased	 gradually	 and	 only	 decreased	 after	 12	 quarters	 but	
remained	positive	over	the	20	quarter	horizon.	According	to	the	study,	the	price	 level	and	
inflation	 in	US	responds	slightly	negative	to	an	expenditure	shock	on	 impact	but	rises	and	
remains	above	 the	 steady	 state	after	5	quarters.	 In	 fact	 consistent	with	economic	 theory,	
the	 fall	 in	 inflation	 is	 precipitated	 by	 upward	movements	 in	 interest	 rates	 by	 the	 central	
bank	(aimed	at	reducing	the	money	supply).	What	is	clearly	evident	here	is	that	apart	from	
the	 consistent	 positive	 output	multipliers,	 the	observed	behaviour	 of	 fiscal	 and	monetary	
variables	are	highly	stable	after	the	government	expenditure	and	revenue	shocks.	This	is	in	
contrast	with	the	observed	behaviour	of	gross	domestic	product,	inflation,	interest	rate	and	
the	 stock	 price	 index	 after	 the	 policy	 innovations	 in	 this	 study.	 Moreover	 for	 both	 a	
quadratic	and	linear	trend,	the	response	pattern	is	highly	volatile	with	the	stock	price	index	
which	 represents	 Brazil’s	 financial	 sector	 in	 this	model	 rising	 above	 and	 falling	 below	 the	
steady	state	several	times	in	response	to	a	positive	revenue	shock.	
										It	 is	noteworthy	that	other	assessments	of	the	effects	of	fiscal	policy	shocks	on	fiscal	
and	monetary	 variables	 (Blanchard	&	 Leigh,	 2013;	 Eyraud	&	Weber,	 2013;	Warner,	 2013;	
Mountford	 &	 Uhlig,	 2005;	 Caldara	 &	 Kamps,	 2002;	 Blanchard	 &	 Perotti,	 2002)	 have	
produced	 similar	 results	 to	 that	 of	 Burrriel,	 et	 al.,	 2010.	 And	 this	 is	 not	 unexpected	 as	
majority	 of	 these	 studies	were	 based	 on	 advanced	 economies	 and	 in	 theory	 the	 findings	
should	be	extrapolated	to	emerging	economies.	However,	there	are	several	factors	peculiar	
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to	emerging	economies	that	can	explain	the	observed	differences	in	the	behaviour	of	fiscal	
and	monetary	variables	after	fiscal	policy	innovations.	
										The	 first	 of	 these	 factors	 is	 the	 inefficiency	 debate.	 The	 rationale	 for	 government	
spending	 to	 stimulate	 economic	 activity	 has	 its	 roots	 in	 Keynesian	 economics	 (Keynes,	
2008).	In	fact	economists	that	adhere	to	the	belief	even	go	on	to	disregard	budget	deficits	if	
extra	 government	 spending	 can	 spur	 growth	 in	 the	 short	 run.	 That	 said,	 the	 literature	on	
optimal	 fiscal	policy	strategy	points	to	the	fact	 that	Keynesian	economics	assume	that	the	
central	 government	 has	 all	 the	 information	 about	 which	 goods	 and	 services	 are	 not	 in	
efficient	use	 (ibid).	However,	 the	 central	 government	as	a	matter	of	 fact	does	not	always	
have	all	the	information	about	where	resources	are	needed	most	and	indeed	if	the	spending	
is	not	on	infrastructure	projects,	utility-generating	economic	activity	or	positive	externalities	
then	it	is	unlikely	to	get	onto	the	production	function	(Warner,	2013).	Where	this	is	the	case	
then	government	spending	will	generate	negative	economic	growth	-	seen	in	the	results	-	as	
resources	are	taken	away	from	the	economy.	
										A	 second	 and	 more	 specific	 reason	 to	 Brazil	 and	 other	 emerging	 economies	 is	 the	
institutional	 debate.	 The	 economic	 and	 political	 institutions	 in	 emerging	 economies	 are	
generally	believed	to	be	weak.	And	Mishkin	(2004)	outlines	these	as	weak	fiscal	institutions,	
low	 credibility	 of	 monetary	 institutions,	 currency	 substitution	 and	 liability	 dollarization,	
vulnerability	 of	 sudden	 stops	 of	 capital	 inflows	 and	 weak	 financial	 institutions	 including	
government	prudential	regulation	and	supervision.	In	fact	for	Brazil,	it	is	well	known	that	the	
banking	 sector	 is	 weak	 and	 not	 well	 developed	 with	 the	 last	 two	 decades	 seeing	 major	
transformations	 in	 the	 sector	 during	 which	 there	 was	 hyperinflation	 solved	 by	 the	
introduction	 of	 the	 Real	 in	 1994.	 Furthermore,	 only	 15%	 of	 Brazilian	 banks	 have	 a	
sustainability	 policy	 (Amigos	Da	 Terra,	 2012)	 -	which	 includes	 but	 not	 limited	 to	 boosting	
and	 harmonizing	 prudential	 regulations	 in	 line	 with	 international	 best	 practices,	
development	 and	 enhancement	 of	 financial	 sector	 supervision	 and	 the	 establishment	 of	
deposit	insurance	and	crisis	resolution	protocols	(Ogawa,	et	al.,	2013)	-	and	this	has	serious	
implications	 for	 the	 transmission	of	 fiscal	 policy	 innovations.	 Financial	 frictions	 present	 in	
Brazil’s	banking	sector	magnifies	the	volatility	seen	in	the	response	of	the	stock	price	index	
to	the	fiscal	policy	 innovation.	And	this	volatility	could	be	also	due	to	the	fact	that	Brazil’s	
economy	is	less	diversified	and	in	fact	dependent	on	commodities.	
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										It	 is	generally	accepted	in	macroeconomics	that	uncertainty	about	future	fiscal	policy	
actions	from	the	central	government	can	cause	current	fiscal	policy	innovations	to	produce	
awkward	 results.	 And	 this	 is	 more	 relevant	 in	 an	 emerging	 economy	 like	 Brazil	 where	
government	purchases	 can	be	highly	 volatile.	 In	 fact	 the	outcome	of	policy	 innovations	 is	
highly	 unpredictable	 in	 countries	 where	 institutions	 that	 provide	 information	 on	 policy	
actions	 are	 opaque	 (Brandao-Marques,	 et	 al.,	 2013)	 and	 this	 opacity	 could	 spur	 corrupt	
practices.	 When	 fiscal	 institutions	 are	 less	 transparent,	 investors,	 public	 institutions,	 the	
central	bank	and	the	private	sector	do	not	have	the	same	information	horizon	and	thus	are	
in	the	dark	about	current	policy	initiatives	and	cannot	carry	out	strategic	policy	response	or	
investment	actions.	This	imply	that	there	is	no	optimal	response	from	the	central	bank	and	
the	 public	 lack	 a	 well-informed	 inflation	 expectation	 thereby	 leading	 to	 the	 volatility	
observed	 in	 the	 fiscal	 and	monetary	 variables	 in	 response	 to	 a	 positive	 government	 and	
revenue	 shock.	Opaque	economic	and	political	 institutions	 lacks	 inclusivity	 (David	&	Petri,	
2013)	and	produces	inefficient	financial	markets	(Malkiel,	2003)	and	the	observed	response	
of	 BOVESPA	 (Brazil’s	 stock	 price	 index)	 which	 represents	 the	 financial	 sector	 in	 the	 VAR	
model	employed	is	testament	to	this	assertion.	In	fact	efficient	markets	driven	by	a	quality	
and	 accurate	 information	 horizon	 reduces	 the	 incidence	 of	 disproportionate	 reaction	 of	
investors	to	new	information	and	enable	prices	to	reflect	all	the	available	information	in	an	
efficient	 manner	 (ibid),	 increasing	 price	 stability	 in	 the	 process.	 I	 hereby	 present	 an	
economic	 explanation	of	 how	 the	multiplier	 effect	 of	 government	 expenditure	may	differ	
under	inclusive	and	exclusive	economic	and	political	institutions.	
										Let	us	assume	the	Brazilian	and	USA	economy	is	both	made	up	of	two	representative	
economic	agents	i.e.	the	central	government	and	the	consumer	both	existing	and	operating	
under	opaque	and	 transparent	 institutional	 frameworks	 respectively.	We	also	assume	 the	
government	 adheres	 to	 Keynesian	 economics	 and	 thus	 in	 USA	 decides	 to	 spend	 £200	 on	
providing	 infrastructure	 for	 the	 consumer.	 We	 assume	 that	 both	 agents	 have	 a	 linear	
marginal	propensity	to	consume	(MPC)	of	0.65	(65%)	implying	that	they	spend/invest	0.65	*	
200	=	$130	and	save	£70	and	thus	the	government	collects	£130	in	taxes.	The	government	
then	 spends	 0.65	 *	 130	 =	 $84.5	 on	 externalities	 for	 the	 consumer	 this	 time	 round	 and	
collects	0.65	*	84.5	=	$54.9	in	taxes.	
	
In	this	model	GDP	or	total	output	=	200	+	0.65*200	+0.652	*	200	+	0.653	*	200	+…	
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We	can	then	rewrite	this	as	200	(1	+	0.65	+	0.652	+	0.653	+…0.65n)		
Where	n	is	the	number	of	cycles	between	the	central	government	and	the	consumers.	The	
multiplier	=	 99:;.=>	=	 9;.?>	=2.86	*	200	=	$572	meaning	that	an	extra	dollar	given	an	MPC	of	
0.65	will	yield	£572	to	the	economy.	So	in	this	model,	the	linear	MPC	drives	the	multiplier	
and	 this	 is	 stable	 throughout	 the	 cycle	 because	 the	 consumer	 has	 credible	 information	
about	 the	 spending	 patterns	 of	 the	 central	 government	 and	 due	 to	 the	 inclusive	 and	
transparent	nature	of	the	economic	and	political	 institutions,	all	the	$200	is	actually	spent	
on	infrastructure	projects	that	benefit	the	consumer.	
										However,	 the	central	government	and	the	consumer	 in	Brazil	do	not	enjoy	the	same	
transparent	 and	 inclusive	 economic	 and	 political	 institutions	 in	 USA	 and	 thus	 are	 not	
compelled	 to	 spend	 all	 the	 $200	 earmarked	 for	 infrastructure	 and	 utility-generating	
economic	 activity	 on	 the	 said	 projects.	 This	 means	 the	 dollar	 effect	 of	 the	 multiplier	 is	
reduced	in	nominal	terms	providing	an	explanation	for	the	negative	output	observed	after	
fiscal	policy	innovations	by	Brasilia.	
	 Discussion	
	
										This	 thesis	 presents	 a	 detailed	 and	 comprehensive	 assessment	 of	 the	 effect	 of	 fiscal	
policy	shock	in	a	prototypical	emerging	economy	like	Brazil.	I	found	that	unlike	the	general	
results	seen	for	advanced	economies,	a	unit	rise	in	government	purchases	and	a	unit	fall	in	
tax	revenue	did	not	 lead	to	economic	growth	 in	the	short	run.	Although	economic	growth	
occurs	at	some	point	in	the	long	run,	the	economic	and	political	motivations	for	such	policy	
innovations	–	based	on	Keynesian	economics	–	are	such	that	extra	expenditure	occurs	only	
because	 the	policymaker	believes	 that	 it	will	 spur	 economic	 growth	 in	 the	 very	 short	 run	
while	 pushing	 interest	 rates	 up	 and	 lowering	 inflation;	 outcomes	 desired	 by	 the	 voting	
public	and	the	policymaker.	That	said,	while	the	response	of	fiscal	series	to	an	expenditure	
shock	 (for	 both	 a	 linear	 and	 quadratic	 VECM)	 does	 not	 fit	 expectations	 as	 per	 economic	
theory,	 it	can	be	seen	that	the	baseline	monetary	variables	behave	as	expected	 i.e.	rise	 in	
interest	rates	causes	a	downward	pressure	on	inflation	as	the	money	supply	reduces.	I	also	
explained	that	 the	difference	seen	 in	 the	 fiscal	and	monetary	variables	 in	 response	to	 the	
fiscal	policy	innovations	could	primarily	be	due	to	weak	transmission	mechanisms	that	arise	
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as	a	result	of	opaque	and	exclusive	economic	and	political	institutions	in	Brazil	and	the	mass	
protests	in	Brazil	in	June	2013	is	testament	to	this.		
										There	 are	 a	 number	 of	 factors	 that	 could	 have	 affected	 the	 results	 of	 this	 thesis.	
Firstly,	 the	number	of	data	observations	𝜂	 =48	 is	 very	 small.	 This	 is	because	GDP	data	on	
Brazil	from	the	IMF	website	starts	from	the	mid-1990s	and	there	appeared	to	be	a	limit	of	5	
lags	when	I	was	selecting	the	optimal	lag	for	the	SVAR/VECM	in	Eviews	6	student	version.	It	
is	well	known	that	 results	 in	a	VAR	framework	are	affected	by	 the	number	of	 lags	chosen	
although	 the	 literature	 seems	 to	 point	 to	 4	 lags	 as	 the	 optimal.	 Furthermore,	 for	 most	
central	governments,	 fiscal	policy	decisions	are	made	yearly	with	the	possibility	of	making	
minor	 adjustments	 throughout	 the	 year.	 And	 for	 the	 voting	 public	 and	 consumers,	 the	
announcement	 of	 an	 intended	 policy	 action	 induces	 these	 rational	 agents	 to	 adjust	 their	
consumption	patterns	accordingly	before	the	onset	of	the	policy.	Thus	the	estimates	of	the	
impact	 of	 a	 fiscal	 policy	 shock	 presented	 in	 this	 thesis	 based	 on	 quarterly	 data	 could	 be	
biased	 (Burriel,	 et	 al.,	 2010).	 To	 address	 this,	 researchers	 such	 as	 Blanchard	 and	 Perotti,	
2002	included	an	indicator	of	forthcoming	fiscal	policy	actions	in	their	estimation	and	I	could	
not	factor	this	into	the	estimation	in	this	thesis	due	to	time	constraints.	In	order	to	test	the	
validity	that	fiscal	and	monetary	variables	respond	differently	in	an	emerging	economy	due	
to	the	many	reasons	offered	in	this	thesis,	future	estimations	can	include	Russia,	India	and	
China	 other	 emerging	 economies	 albeit	 with	 a	 higher	 number	 of	 data	 observations.	
Furthermore,	 these	 results	 can	 then	 be	 compared	 to	 other	 approaches	 such	 as	 the	 sign	
restrictions,	event	study	and	the	Blanchard	Perotti.		
										In	conclusion,	expansionary	fiscal	policy	is	good	but	should	be	aimed	at	infrastructure	
projects,	utility-generating	economic	activities	and	externalities	that	gets	onto	the	economic	
production	function.	Alternatively,	Brasilia	can	choose	to	support	the	private	sector	through	
government	secured	 loan	schemes	or	 funding	 for	 lending	schemes	 (as	pertains	 to	 the	UK)	
from	the	central	bank	so	that	the	sector	can	expand	production,	employ	more	workers	and	
generate	extra	revenue	through	income	tax	for	the	government	which	then	can	be	used	for	
more	government	purchases,	assuming	business	leaders	in	Brazil	do	not	see	direct	attempts	
from	Brasilia	 to	achieve	 full	employment	as	undermining	 their	political	 clout.	 Last	but	not	
least,	emerging	economies	like	Brazil	should	aim	at	strengthening	their	economic,	financial	
and	political	institutions	with	particular	emphasis	on	making	these	institutions	transparent,	
communication/information	savvy	and	inclusive	for	all	and	sundry.	
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	 Appendix		
Data	
Variable																																		Description/Units																			Range																							Source	
Expend										Log	of	Government	Expenditure	+											1997Q1-2008Q4									IMF	WEO	
																							Gross	Investment	Percent	of	GDP	
GDP															Log	of	Real	Gross	Domestic	Product								1997Q1-2008Q4									IMF	WEO	
																							in	Constant	Prices	(Percent	Change)	
INF																	Difference	of	Gross	Domestic																				1997Q1-2008Q4									IMF	WEO																								
																							Product	Deflator		(Index)										
REV																Log	of	General	Government	Revenue					1997Q1-2008Q4									IMF	WEO	
																							Percent	of	GDP								
INT																	Real	Interest	Rate																																							1997Q1-2008Q4										WB	OD	
STOCKPIX						Log	of	Real	Stock	Price	Index																				1997Q1-2008Q4						Yahoo	Finance	
																							(BOVESPA)																																																																												
IMF	WEO	=	International	Monetary	Fund	World	Economic	Outlook	April	2013	
WB	OD				=		World	Bank	Open	Data	Website	
	
	
Eviews	Outputs	
	
Unit	Root	Tests	For	Stationarity	for	Expend	
 
Null Hypothesis: EXPEND has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 1 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.348639  0.5989 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.581152  
 5% level  -2.926622  
 10% level  -2.601424  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(EXPEND)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/20/13   Time: 21:24   
Sample (adjusted): 1997Q3 2008Q4  
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     EXPEND(-1) -0.103433 0.076694 -1.348639 0.1845 
D(EXPEND(-1)) 0.060820 0.156492 0.388646 0.6995 
C 0.086206 0.063783 1.351556 0.1836 
     
     R-squared 0.040586    Mean dependent var 0.000190 
Adjusted R-squared -0.004038    S.D. dependent var 0.004169 
S.E. of regression 0.004177    Akaike info criterion -8.055352 
Sum squared resid 0.000750    Schwarz criterion -7.936093 
Log likelihood 188.2731    Hannan-Quinn criter. -8.010677 
F-statistic 0.909513    Durbin-Watson stat 2.005760 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.410327    
     
     	
First	Difference	of	Expend	
 
Null Hypothesis: D(EXPEND) has a unit root  
Exogenous: None   
Lag Length: 0 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -6.708204  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.616203  
 5% level  -1.948140  
 10% level  -1.612320  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(EXPEND,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/20/13   Time: 21:30   
Sample (adjusted): 1997Q3 2008Q4  
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(EXPEND(-1)) -1.000000 0.149071 -6.708204 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.500000    Mean dependent var 0.000000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.500000    S.D. dependent var 0.005902 
S.E. of regression 0.004173    Akaike info criterion -8.098761 
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Sum squared resid 0.000784    Schwarz criterion -8.059008 
Log likelihood 187.2715    Hannan-Quinn criter. -8.083870 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.000000    
     
      
Unit	Root	Tests	for	Stationarity	of	GDP	
 
Null Hypothesis: GDP has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 1 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.199881  0.2091 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.581152  
 5% level  -2.926622  
 10% level  -2.601424  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(GDP)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/20/13   Time: 21:35   
Sample (adjusted): 1997Q3 2008Q4  
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     GDP(-1) -0.206328 0.093790 -2.199881 0.0332 
D(GDP(-1)) 0.105075 0.152280 0.690012 0.4939 
C 0.030533 0.035515 0.859732 0.3947 
     
     R-squared 0.101161    Mean dependent var 0.002320 
Adjusted R-squared 0.059354    S.D. dependent var 0.231586 
S.E. of regression 0.224608    Akaike info criterion -0.085925 
Sum squared resid 2.169300    Schwarz criterion 0.033334 
Log likelihood 4.976276    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.041250 
F-statistic 2.419738    Durbin-Watson stat 2.023692 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.100963    
     
     	
First	Difference	of	GDP	
 
Null Hypothesis: D(GDP) has a unit root  
Exogenous: None   
Lag Length: 0 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -6.708204  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.616203  
 5% level  -1.948140  
 10% level  -1.612320  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(GDP,2)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/20/13   Time: 21:37   
Sample (adjusted): 1997Q3 2008Q4  
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(GDP(-1)) -1.000000 0.149071 -6.708204 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.500000    Mean dependent var -8.39E-18 
Adjusted R-squared 0.500000    S.D. dependent var 0.327529 
S.E. of regression 0.231598    Akaike info criterion -0.066128 
Sum squared resid 2.413693    Schwarz criterion -0.026375 
Log likelihood 2.520943    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.051236 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.000000    
     
     	
Unit	Root	Test	For	Stationarity	of	INF	
 
Null Hypothesis: INF has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 1 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -0.341040  0.9104 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.581152  
 5% level  -2.926622  
 10% level  -2.601424  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(INF)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/20/13   Time: 21:39   
Sample (adjusted): 1997Q3 2008Q4  
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     INF(-1) -0.006314 0.018514 -0.341040 0.7347 
D(INF(-1)) -0.277549 0.146678 -1.892235 0.0652 
C 0.014135 0.024301 0.581658 0.5638 
     
     R-squared 0.081965    Mean dependent var 0.004572 
Adjusted R-squared 0.039266    S.D. dependent var 0.008707 
S.E. of regression 0.008534    Akaike info criterion -6.626526 
Sum squared resid 0.003132    Schwarz criterion -6.507267 
Log likelihood 155.4101    Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.581851 
F-statistic 1.919595    Durbin-Watson stat 2.220086 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.159027    
     
     	
First	Difference	of	INF	
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Null Hypothesis: D(INF) has a unit root  
Exogenous: None   
Lag Length: 0 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -6.708204  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.616203  
 5% level  -1.948140  
 10% level  -1.612320  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(INF,2)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/20/13   Time: 21:41   
Sample (adjusted): 1997Q3 2008Q4  
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(INF(-1)) -1.000000 0.149071 -6.708204 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.500000    Mean dependent var 0.000000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.500000    S.D. dependent var 0.013941 
S.E. of regression 0.009858    Akaike info criterion -6.379599 
Sum squared resid 0.004373    Schwarz criterion -6.339846 
Log likelihood 147.7308    Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.364708 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.000000    
     
     	
Unit	Root	Test	For	Stationarity	of	REV	
 
Null Hypothesis: REV has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 1 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.827505  0.3629 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.581152  
 5% level  -2.926622  
 10% level  -2.601424  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(REV)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/20/13   Time: 21:43   
Sample (adjusted): 1997Q3 2008Q4  
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     REV(-1) -0.180231 0.098621 -1.827505 0.0746 
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D(REV(-1)) 0.100972 0.158485 0.637108 0.5274 
C 0.159893 0.087235 1.832894 0.0737 
     
     R-squared 0.072127    Mean dependent var 0.000473 
Adjusted R-squared 0.028970    S.D. dependent var 0.005434 
S.E. of regression 0.005355    Akaike info criterion -7.558672 
Sum squared resid 0.001233    Schwarz criterion -7.439413 
Log likelihood 176.8495    Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.513997 
F-statistic 1.671277    Durbin-Watson stat 2.017896 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.199987    
     
     	
First	Difference	Test	for	REV	
 
Null Hypothesis: D(REV) has a unit root  
Exogenous: None   
Lag Length: 0 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -6.708204  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.616203  
 5% level  -1.948140  
 10% level  -1.612320  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(REV,2)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/20/13   Time: 21:44   
Sample (adjusted): 1997Q3 2008Q4  
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(REV(-1)) -1.000000 0.149071 -6.708204 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.500000    Mean dependent var 0.000000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.500000    S.D. dependent var 0.007715 
S.E. of regression 0.005455    Akaike info criterion -7.563053 
Sum squared resid 0.001339    Schwarz criterion -7.523299 
Log likelihood 174.9502    Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.548161 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.000000    
     
     	
Unit	Root	Test	For	Stationarity	of	INT	
 
Null Hypothesis: INT has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 1 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -0.983320  0.7516 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.581152  
 5% level  -2.926622  
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 10% level  -2.601424  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(INT)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/20/13   Time: 21:45   
Sample (adjusted): 1997Q3 2008Q4  
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     INT(-1) -0.044045 0.044792 -0.983320 0.3310 
D(INT(-1)) -0.014501 0.152492 -0.095096 0.9247 
C 0.039432 0.043626 0.903870 0.3711 
     
     R-squared 0.023358    Mean dependent var -0.003268 
Adjusted R-squared -0.022067    S.D. dependent var 0.017090 
S.E. of regression 0.017278    Akaike info criterion -5.215774 
Sum squared resid 0.012837    Schwarz criterion -5.096514 
Log likelihood 122.9628    Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.171098 
F-statistic 0.514212    Durbin-Watson stat 2.003864 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.601602    
     
     	
First	Difference	Test	for	INT	
 
Null Hypothesis: D(INT) has a unit root  
Exogenous: None   
Lag Length: 0 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -6.708204  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.616203  
 5% level  -1.948140  
 10% level  -1.612320  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(INT,2)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/20/13   Time: 21:46   
Sample (adjusted): 1997Q3 2008Q4  
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(INT(-1)) -1.000000 0.149071 -6.708204 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.500000    Mean dependent var 0.000000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.500000    S.D. dependent var 0.024617 
S.E. of regression 0.017407    Akaike info criterion -5.242400 
Sum squared resid 0.013635    Schwarz criterion -5.202647 
Log likelihood 121.5752    Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.227509 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.000000    
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Unit	Root	Test	For	Stationarity	for	STOCKPIX	
 
Null Hypothesis: STOCKPIX has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 1 (Fixed)   
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.584969  0.0006 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.581152  
 5% level  -2.926622  
 10% level  -2.601424  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(STOCKPIX)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/20/13   Time: 21:49   
Sample (adjusted): 1997Q3 2008Q4  
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     STOCKPIX(-1) -0.948197 0.206806 -4.584969 0.0000 
D(STOCKPIX(-1)) 0.125896 0.157108 0.801336 0.4273 
C 0.035857 0.024944 1.437515 0.1578 
     
     R-squared 0.411475    Mean dependent var -0.013817 
Adjusted R-squared 0.384102    S.D. dependent var 0.190421 
S.E. of regression 0.149441    Akaike info criterion -0.900840 
Sum squared resid 0.960300    Schwarz criterion -0.781580 
Log likelihood 23.71931    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.856164 
F-statistic 15.03201    Durbin-Watson stat 1.866649 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000011    
     
     	
Testing	Whether	Expend	Gdp	Inf	Rev	Int	and	Stockpix	are	Cointegrated	
 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPEND   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/23/13   Time: 18:25   
Sample: 1997Q1 2008Q4   
Included observations: 48   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.316731 0.306231 1.034289 0.3069 
GDP 0.000632 0.011862 0.053268 0.9578 
INF -0.153321 0.087401 -1.754225 0.0867 
REV 3.473637 0.347413 9.998582 0.0000 
INT 0.144011 0.121952 1.180877 0.2443 
STOCKPIX -0.021583 0.015289 -1.411655 0.1654 
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R-squared 0.811357    Mean dependent var 3.328508 
Adjusted R-squared 0.788900    S.D. dependent var 0.034378 
S.E. of regression 0.015795    Akaike info criterion -5.341731 
Sum squared resid 0.010479    Schwarz criterion -5.107831 
Log likelihood 134.2015    Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.253340 
F-statistic 36.12867    Durbin-Watson stat 0.503507 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
 
Dependent Variable: D(E)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/23/13   Time: 18:28   
Sample (adjusted): 1997Q3 2008Q4  
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     E(-1) -0.310897 0.107960 -2.879733 0.0061 
D(E(-1)) 0.174596 0.148874 1.172782 0.2472 
     
     R-squared 0.158808    Mean dependent var -1.22E-05 
Adjusted R-squared 0.139690    S.D. dependent var 0.010827 
S.E. of regression 0.010043    Akaike info criterion -6.321417 
Sum squared resid 0.004438    Schwarz criterion -6.241911 
Log likelihood 147.3926    Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.291634 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.046465    
     
      
 
Var	Lag	Order	Selection	
 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria     
Endogenous variables: EXPEND GDP INF REV INT STOCKPIX    
Exogenous variables: C      
Date: 06/23/13   Time: 19:13     
Sample: 1997Q1 2008Q4     
Included observations: 43     
       
        Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0  481.2468 NA   1.01e-17 -22.10450 -21.85875 -22.01388 
1  672.1348  319.6265  7.66e-21 -29.30860 -27.58835 -28.67422 
2  685.2240  18.26390  2.46e-20 -28.24297 -25.04824 -27.06486 
3  719.3368  38.07944  3.53e-20 -28.15520 -23.48597 -26.43333 
4  974.0012  213.2074  2.48e-24 -38.32564 -32.18191 -36.06002 
5  1098.883   69.70177*   1.41e-25*  -42.45970*  -34.84148*  -39.65034* 
       
        * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
       
	
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates     
 Date: 07/16/13   Time: 20:23     
 Sample (adjusted): 1998Q2 2008Q4     
 Included observations: 43 after adjustments    
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 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]    
       
       Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1      
       
       EXPEND(-1)  1.000000      
       
GDP(-1)  0.098240      
  (0.00463)      
 [ 21.1982]      
       
INF(-1)  0.529094      
  (0.00646)      
 [ 81.9414]      
       
REV(-1) -5.046066      
  (0.06026)      
 [-83.7344]      
       
INT(-1)  1.064197      
  (0.02547)      
 [ 41.7850]      
       
STOCKPIX(-1)  0.006908      
  (0.00194)      
 [ 3.55768]      
       
C -0.597844      
       
       Error Correction: D(EXPEND) D(GDP) D(INF) D(REV) D(INT) D(STOCKPIX) 
       
       CointEq1 -4.435512  35.43492 -0.347351 -1.664455 -3.891037  68.79204 
  (1.91256)  (17.8243)  (0.59538)  (0.64637)  (2.61097)  (25.4224) 
 [-2.31915] [ 1.98801] [-0.58341] [-2.57507] [-1.49027] [ 2.70596] 
       
D(EXPEND(-1)) -1.766941  13.95924 -0.126707 -0.656399 -1.537052  26.11035 
  (0.76370)  (7.11736)  (0.23774)  (0.25810)  (1.04258)  (10.1513) 
 [-2.31367] [ 1.96130] [-0.53297] [-2.54320] [-1.47428] [ 2.57211] 
       
D(EXPEND(-2)) -1.411385  11.65635 -0.140233 -0.545152 -1.239571  24.48557 
  (0.74693)  (6.96109)  (0.23252)  (0.25243)  (1.01968)  (9.92845) 
 [-1.88958] [ 1.67450] [-0.60311] [-2.15959] [-1.21564] [ 2.46620] 
       
D(EXPEND(-3)) -1.722230  14.05340 -0.176882 -0.660583 -1.388969  18.67772 
  (0.72063)  (6.71602)  (0.22433)  (0.24355)  (0.98379)  (9.57891) 
 [-2.38988] [ 2.09252] [-0.78848] [-2.71235] [-1.41186] [ 1.94988] 
       
D(EXPEND(-4)) -0.475023  2.188811  0.041706 -0.303513 -0.946652  22.92363 
  (0.71338)  (6.64839)  (0.22207)  (0.24109)  (0.97388)  (9.48245) 
 [-0.66588] [ 0.32922] [ 0.18780] [-1.25890] [-0.97204] [ 2.41748] 
       
D(GDP(-1)) -0.016109  0.109230  0.001814 -0.004601 -0.020159  0.140435 
  (0.01633)  (0.15218)  (0.00508)  (0.00552)  (0.02229)  (0.21706) 
 [-0.98649] [ 0.71776] [ 0.35692] [-0.83375] [-0.90432] [ 0.64700] 
       
D(GDP(-2))  0.020914 -0.132498  0.001407  0.007417  0.007837  0.013926 
  (0.01590)  (0.14817)  (0.00495)  (0.00537)  (0.02170)  (0.21133) 
 [ 1.31549] [-0.89425] [ 0.28435] [ 1.38036] [ 0.36107] [ 0.06590] 
       
D(GDP(-3))  0.002020  0.021117 -0.002393 -0.000107  0.003991 -0.337507 
  (0.01620)  (0.15094)  (0.00504)  (0.00547)  (0.02211)  (0.21529) 
 [ 0.12473] [ 0.13990] [-0.47466] [-0.01958] [ 0.18050] [-1.56770] 
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D(GDP(-4))  0.022103 -0.657583  8.24E-05 -0.009905  0.015245 -0.280734 
  (0.01631)  (0.15204)  (0.00508)  (0.00551)  (0.02227)  (0.21685) 
 [ 1.35488] [-4.32513] [ 0.01623] [-1.79660] [ 0.68450] [-1.29461] 
       
D(INF(-1)) -12.92004  100.6864 -1.049292 -4.851561 -10.48107  201.1135 
  (5.49494)  (51.2107)  (1.71057)  (1.85708)  (7.50152)  (73.0406) 
 [-2.35126] [ 1.96612] [-0.61342] [-2.61247] [-1.39719] [ 2.75345] 
       
D(INF(-2)) -12.56572  98.02079 -0.992439 -4.714612 -10.38629  202.1718 
  (5.50884)  (51.3402)  (1.71490)  (1.86177)  (7.52049)  (73.2254) 
 [-2.28101] [ 1.90924] [-0.57872] [-2.53232] [-1.38107] [ 2.76095] 
       
D(INF(-3)) -12.28210  96.63087 -1.064416 -4.642208 -9.950809  201.9276 
  (5.44299)  (50.7266)  (1.69440)  (1.83952)  (7.43061)  (72.3502) 
 [-2.25650] [ 1.90494] [-0.62820] [-2.52360] [-1.33917] [ 2.79098] 
       
D(INF(-4)) -12.87575  100.9297 -0.120633 -4.764651 -10.74769  201.4900 
  (5.46736)  (50.9537)  (1.70199)  (1.84776)  (7.46387)  (72.6740) 
 [-2.35502] [ 1.98081] [-0.07088] [-2.57862] [-1.43996] [ 2.77252] 
       
D(REV(-1)) -9.072951  72.45275 -0.694760 -3.412348 -8.132153  156.0878 
  (4.14016)  (38.5846)  (1.28883)  (1.39921)  (5.65201)  (55.0324) 
 [-2.19145] [ 1.87776] [-0.53906] [-2.43876] [-1.43881] [ 2.83629] 
       
D(REV(-2)) -10.18094  79.88218 -0.802374 -3.804843 -8.447673  145.1672 
  (4.28822)  (39.9645)  (1.33492)  (1.44925)  (5.85415)  (57.0005) 
 [-2.37416] [ 1.99883] [-0.60106] [-2.62538] [-1.44302] [ 2.54677] 
       
D(REV(-3)) -9.585930  75.41648 -0.591916 -3.539369 -8.794579  166.3145 
  (4.14791)  (38.6569)  (1.29124)  (1.40183)  (5.66259)  (55.1354) 
 [-2.31103] [ 1.95092] [-0.45841] [-2.52482] [-1.55310] [ 3.01647] 
       
D(REV(-4)) -10.36428  95.69661 -0.906733 -4.238356 -8.493786  151.6024 
  (4.33315)  (40.3832)  (1.34891)  (1.46444)  (5.91548)  (57.5977) 
 [-2.39186] [ 2.36971] [-0.67220] [-2.89419] [-1.43586] [ 2.63209] 
       
D(INT(-1))  2.941492 -23.15961  0.240730  1.108564  2.459089 -46.34852 
  (1.27091)  (11.8443)  (0.39563)  (0.42952)  (1.73500)  (16.8933) 
 [ 2.31448] [-1.95533] [ 0.60847] [ 2.58095] [ 1.41734] [-2.74360] 
       
D(INT(-2))  3.094201 -24.11962  0.242363  1.157555  2.540728 -46.43778 
  (1.30646)  (12.1757)  (0.40670)  (0.44153)  (1.78354)  (17.3660) 
 [ 2.36838] [-1.98096] [ 0.59592] [ 2.62167] [ 1.42454] [-2.67407] 
       
D(INT(-3))  2.882430 -22.65507  0.223481  1.081270  2.450410 -46.06624 
  (1.29396)  (12.0592)  (0.40281)  (0.43731)  (1.76647)  (17.1998) 
 [ 2.22760] [-1.87865] [ 0.55481] [ 2.47256] [ 1.38718] [-2.67831] 
       
D(INT(-4))  2.269123 -24.99911  0.146678  0.847350  2.525814 -45.23071 
  (1.25622)  (11.7075)  (0.39106)  (0.42455)  (1.71496)  (16.6982) 
 [ 1.80631] [-2.13531] [ 0.37508] [ 1.99586] [ 1.47282] [-2.70873] 
       
D(STOCKPIX(-1))  0.045183 -0.269791  0.002993  0.016695  0.022006 -1.640244 
  (0.03484)  (0.32466)  (0.01084)  (0.01177)  (0.04756)  (0.46305) 
 [ 1.29703] [-0.83100] [ 0.27595] [ 1.41809] [ 0.46273] [-3.54225] 
       
D(STOCKPIX(-2))  0.090708 -0.545441  0.000752  0.030586  0.056687 -1.512402 
  (0.03957)  (0.36876)  (0.01232)  (0.01337)  (0.05402)  (0.52596) 
 [ 2.29243] [-1.47911] [ 0.06103] [ 2.28721] [ 1.04941] [-2.87551] 
       
D(STOCKPIX(-3))  0.036122 -0.147874 -0.005311  0.010246  0.031920 -1.360380 
  (0.03512)  (0.32726)  (0.01093)  (0.01187)  (0.04794)  (0.46676) 
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 [ 1.02867] [-0.45186] [-0.48582] [ 0.86340] [ 0.66586] [-2.91451] 
       
D(STOCKPIX(-4)) -0.003138  0.058584  0.002261 -0.000589 -0.021595 -0.314117 
  (0.02478)  (0.23091)  (0.00771)  (0.00837)  (0.03383)  (0.32935) 
 [-0.12663] [ 0.25370] [ 0.29312] [-0.07038] [-0.63842] [-0.95376] 
       
C  0.302695 -2.371244  0.025041  0.113965  0.247684 -4.856616 
  (0.13189)  (1.22920)  (0.04106)  (0.04458)  (0.18006)  (1.75318) 
 [ 2.29498] [-1.92909] [ 0.60989] [ 2.55668] [ 1.37558] [-2.77017] 
       
        R-squared  0.779522  0.807928  0.931075  0.786008  0.583622  0.702277 
 Adj. R-squared  0.455290  0.525469  0.829715  0.471313 -0.028700  0.264449 
 Sum sq. resids  0.002372  0.206054  0.000230  0.000271  0.004421  0.419170 
 S.E. equation  0.011813  0.110095  0.003677  0.003992  0.016127  0.157026 
 F-statistic  2.404208  2.860338  9.185792  2.497687  0.953130  1.604003 
 Log likelihood  149.7944  53.81318  199.9754  196.4418  136.4094  38.54526 
 Akaike AIC -5.757877 -1.293636 -8.091878 -7.927526 -5.135321 -0.583501 
 Schwarz SC -4.692966 -0.228725 -7.026966 -6.862614 -4.070409  0.481411 
 Mean dependent -0.000169  0.029045  0.004650  0.000313 -0.004567 -0.010506 
 S.D. dependent  0.016006  0.159821  0.008912  0.005491  0.015901  0.183090 
       
        Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  6.20E-27     
 Determinant resid covariance  2.37E-29     
 Log likelihood  1051.056     
 Akaike information criterion -41.35146     
 Schwarz criterion -34.71624     
       
        
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates     
 Date: 07/16/13   Time: 20:31     
 Sample (adjusted): 1998Q2 2008Q4     
 Included observations: 43 after adjustments    
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]    
       
       Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1      
       
       EXPEND(-1)  1.000000      
       
GDP(-1)  0.093262      
  (0.00369)      
 [ 25.2906]      
       
INF(-1)  0.449706      
  (0.03094)      
 [ 14.5332]      
       
REV(-1) -5.101659      
  (0.05468)      
 [-93.2980]      
       
INT(-1)  1.023870      
  (0.02021)      
 [ 50.6531]      
       
STOCKPIX(-1)  0.006561      
  (0.00178)      
 [ 3.67750]      
       
@TREND(97Q1)  0.001161      
       
C -0.434386      
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       Error Correction: D(EXPEND) D(GDP) D(INF) D(REV) D(INT) D(STOCKPIX) 
       
       CointEq1 -5.236020  48.59354 -0.553447 -2.037872 -5.708162  93.65453 
  (2.35832)  (23.3604)  (0.74103)  (0.83635)  (3.38111)  (33.0020) 
 [-2.22023] [ 2.08017] [-0.74687] [-2.43663] [-1.68825] [ 2.83784] 
       
D(EXPEND(-1)) -2.101140  17.26710 -0.129150 -0.774962 -2.099448  32.22397 
  (0.84566)  (8.37665)  (0.26572)  (0.29990)  (1.21241)  (11.8340) 
 [-2.48463] [ 2.06134] [-0.48604] [-2.58407] [-1.73163] [ 2.72301] 
       
D(EXPEND(-2)) -1.761794  14.88839 -0.136321 -0.666375 -1.796751  30.45134 
  (0.82801)  (8.20182)  (0.26017)  (0.29364)  (1.18710)  (11.5870) 
 [-2.12776] [ 1.81525] [-0.52396] [-2.26935] [-1.51356] [ 2.62807] 
       
D(EXPEND(-3)) -2.072434  17.22279 -0.172079 -0.781225 -1.934064  24.53075 
  (0.80133)  (7.93757)  (0.25179)  (0.28418)  (1.14886)  (11.2137) 
 [-2.58625] [ 2.16978] [-0.68342] [-2.74905] [-1.68347] [ 2.18758] 
       
D(EXPEND(-4)) -0.807570  5.294325  0.043298 -0.419452 -1.475959  28.66421 
  (0.79008)  (7.82614)  (0.24826)  (0.28019)  (1.13273)  (11.0562) 
 [-1.02214] [ 0.67649] [ 0.17441] [-1.49702] [-1.30301] [ 2.59258] 
       
D(GDP(-1)) -0.031308  0.183743  0.003138 -0.009238 -0.032451  0.279892 
  (0.01741)  (0.17248)  (0.00547)  (0.00618)  (0.02496)  (0.24367) 
 [-1.79801] [ 1.06529] [ 0.57358] [-1.49603] [-1.29989] [ 1.14865] 
       
D(GDP(-2))  0.003015 -0.056528  0.003187  0.002073 -0.004568  0.156666 
  (0.01671)  (0.16556)  (0.00525)  (0.00593)  (0.02396)  (0.23389) 
 [ 0.18039] [-0.34144] [ 0.60684] [ 0.34966] [-0.19065] [ 0.66982] 
       
D(GDP(-3)) -0.017005  0.100829 -0.000652 -0.005840 -0.008264 -0.186566 
  (0.01631)  (0.16152)  (0.00512)  (0.00578)  (0.02338)  (0.22818) 
 [-1.04289] [ 0.62426] [-0.12726] [-1.00992] [-0.35350] [-0.81762] 
       
D(GDP(-4))  0.002729 -0.572131  0.001679 -0.015821  0.002437 -0.118591 
  (0.01635)  (0.16199)  (0.00514)  (0.00580)  (0.02345)  (0.22884) 
 [ 0.16687] [-3.53196] [ 0.32678] [-2.72804] [ 0.10394] [-0.51822] 
       
D(INF(-1)) -14.88002  134.6441 -1.578888 -5.780241 -15.26937  265.1115 
  (6.58366)  (65.2146)  (2.06870)  (2.33481)  (9.43894)  (92.1307) 
 [-2.26014] [ 2.06463] [-0.76323] [-2.47568] [-1.61770] [ 2.87756] 
       
D(INF(-2)) -14.44931  131.1185 -1.507113 -5.610588 -15.08247  264.5016 
  (6.55389)  (64.9196)  (2.05935)  (2.32425)  (9.39625)  (91.7141) 
 [-2.20469] [ 2.01970] [-0.73184] [-2.41394] [-1.60516] [ 2.88398] 
       
D(INF(-3)) -14.09761  128.8250 -1.564596 -5.508184 -14.53473  262.5294 
  (6.45092)  (63.8997)  (2.02699)  (2.28773)  (9.24863)  (90.2731) 
 [-2.18536] [ 2.01605] [-0.77188] [-2.40771] [-1.57156] [ 2.90817] 
       
D(INF(-4)) -14.60876  132.2036 -0.604653 -5.595312 -15.23454  260.3046 
  (6.42729)  (63.6656)  (2.01956)  (2.27935)  (9.21474)  (89.9424) 
 [-2.27293] [ 2.07653] [-0.29940] [-2.45478] [-1.65328] [ 2.89413] 
       
D(REV(-1)) -10.67888  101.4549 -1.198454 -4.202504 -12.05260  210.9871 
  (5.12991)  (50.8144)  (1.61191)  (1.81925)  (7.35471)  (71.7872) 
 [-2.08169] [ 1.99658] [-0.74350] [-2.31001] [-1.63876] [ 2.93906] 
       
D(REV(-2)) -11.66170  109.0164 -1.336427 -4.566206 -12.37378  200.3143 
  (5.27413)  (52.2430)  (1.65722)  (1.87040)  (7.56148)  (73.8053) 
 [-2.21111] [ 2.08672] [-0.80643] [-2.44130] [-1.63642] [ 2.71409] 
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D(REV(-3)) -11.12965  104.3183 -1.107742 -4.313628 -12.68800  221.0351 
  (5.13444)  (50.8593)  (1.61333)  (1.82086)  (7.36121)  (71.8506) 
 [-2.16764] [ 2.05112] [-0.68662] [-2.36901] [-1.72363] [ 3.07632] 
       
D(REV(-4)) -11.86828  124.7358 -1.428326 -5.002340 -12.43066  206.5387 
  (5.30733)  (52.5719)  (1.66766)  (1.88217)  (7.60908)  (74.2700) 
 [-2.23620] [ 2.37267] [-0.85649] [-2.65775] [-1.63366] [ 2.78092] 
       
D(INT(-1))  3.242619 -29.64347  0.349544  1.265137  3.400953 -58.51602 
  (1.45535)  (14.4160)  (0.45730)  (0.51612)  (2.08653)  (20.3660) 
 [ 2.22806] [-2.05629] [ 0.76437] [ 2.45124] [ 1.62996] [-2.87322] 
       
D(INT(-2))  3.357531 -30.49624  0.354905  1.302991  3.470258 -58.39416 
  (1.48281)  (14.6880)  (0.46593)  (0.52586)  (2.12590)  (20.7503) 
 [ 2.26430] [-2.07626] [ 0.76172] [ 2.47783] [ 1.63237] [-2.81414] 
       
D(INT(-3))  3.140037 -28.85506  0.331165  1.222542  3.360538 -57.68224 
  (1.46273)  (14.4891)  (0.45962)  (0.51874)  (2.09711)  (20.4693) 
 [ 2.14669] [-1.99150] [ 0.72052] [ 2.35676] [ 1.60246] [-2.81799] 
       
D(INT(-4))  2.525252 -31.02733  0.249985  0.986020  3.412104 -56.52372 
  (1.42032)  (14.0690)  (0.44629)  (0.50370)  (2.03631)  (19.8758) 
 [ 1.77794] [-2.20536] [ 0.56014] [ 1.95756] [ 1.67563] [-2.84385] 
       
D(STOCKPIX(-1))  0.043675 -0.350158  0.004903  0.017153  0.035613 -1.787383 
  (0.03522)  (0.34885)  (0.01107)  (0.01249)  (0.05049)  (0.49283) 
 [ 1.24016] [-1.00376] [ 0.44308] [ 1.37338] [ 0.70533] [-3.62679] 
       
D(STOCKPIX(-2))  0.084019 -0.614458  0.003417  0.029616  0.068396 -1.637894 
  (0.03920)  (0.38825)  (0.01232)  (0.01390)  (0.05619)  (0.54849) 
 [ 2.14360] [-1.58264] [ 0.27742] [ 2.13067] [ 1.21715] [-2.98618] 
       
D(STOCKPIX(-3))  0.029137 -0.197115 -0.003128  0.008945  0.040895 -1.448652 
  (0.03429)  (0.33965)  (0.01077)  (0.01216)  (0.04916)  (0.47983) 
 [ 0.84975] [-0.58035] [-0.29032] [ 0.73557] [ 0.83189] [-3.01909] 
       
D(STOCKPIX(-4)) -0.009004  0.033237  0.003913 -0.001797 -0.017393 -0.359826 
  (0.02402)  (0.23792)  (0.00755)  (0.00852)  (0.03444)  (0.33612) 
 [-0.37487] [ 0.13970] [ 0.51848] [-0.21098] [-0.50509] [-1.07052] 
       
C  0.233680 -2.201690  0.029187  0.092725  0.243670 -4.498403 
  (0.11082)  (1.09770)  (0.03482)  (0.03930)  (0.15888)  (1.55076) 
 [ 2.10870] [-2.00573] [ 0.83821] [ 2.35942] [ 1.53370] [-2.90078] 
       
@TREND(97Q1)  0.004305 -0.036298  0.000308  0.001610  0.004395 -0.069823 
  (0.00176)  (0.01745)  (0.00055)  (0.00062)  (0.00253)  (0.02466) 
 [ 2.44303] [-2.07964] [ 0.55702] [ 2.57724] [ 1.73988] [-2.83166] 
       
        R-squared  0.810817  0.813817  0.939744  0.797816  0.605957  0.716861 
 Adj. R-squared  0.503395  0.511270  0.841829  0.469267 -0.034362  0.256761 
 Sum sq. resids  0.002036  0.199736  0.000201  0.000256  0.004184  0.398636 
 S.E. equation  0.011280  0.111730  0.003544  0.004000  0.016171  0.157844 
 F-statistic  2.637472  2.689887  9.597522  2.428299  0.946336  1.558055 
 Log likelihood  153.0857  54.48273  202.8655  197.6621  137.5948  39.62513 
 Akaike AIC -5.864450 -1.278266 -8.179790 -7.937774 -5.143945 -0.587216 
 Schwarz SC -4.758580 -0.172397 -7.073921 -6.831905 -4.038075  0.518654 
 Mean dependent -0.000169  0.029045  0.004650  0.000313 -0.004567 -0.010506 
 S.D. dependent  0.016006  0.159821  0.008912  0.005491  0.015901  0.183090 
       
        Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  5.68E-27     
 Determinant resid covariance  1.51E-29     
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 Log likelihood  1060.739     
 Akaike information criterion -41.52274     
 Schwarz criterion -34.64178     
       
        
 
VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag 
order h 
Date: 07/22/13   Time: 19:52 
Sample: 1997Q1 2008Q4 
Included observations: 43 
   
   Lags LM-Stat Prob 
   
   1  12.95622  0.9999 
2  26.79216  0.8674 
3  31.71051  0.6728 
4  132.9666  0.0000 
   
   Probs from chi-square with 36 df. 	
 
VEC Residual Normality Tests   
Orthogonalization: Cholesky (Lutkepohl)  
Null Hypothesis: residuals are multivariate normal  
Date: 07/22/13   Time: 20:21   
Sample: 1997Q1 2008Q4   
Included observations: 43   
     
          
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob. 
     
     1 -0.077990  0.043591 1  0.8346 
2  1.098125  8.642133 1  0.0033 
3  0.005016  0.000180 1  0.9893 
4 -1.459764  15.27154 1  0.0001 
5 -0.290463  0.604642 1  0.4368 
6  0.100612  0.072546 1  0.7877 
     
     Joint   24.63463 6  0.0004 
     
          
Component Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob. 
     
     1  2.537186  0.383770 1  0.5356 
2  9.714914  80.78638 1  0.0000 
3  4.196018  2.562904 1  0.1094 
4  14.64262  242.8616 1  0.0000 
5  4.478904  3.918658 1  0.0478 
6  2.648363  0.221537 1  0.6379 
     
     Joint   330.7349 6  0.0000 
     
          
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob.  
     
     1  0.427361 2  0.8076  
2  89.42851 2  0.0000  
3  2.563084 2  0.2776  
4  258.1332 2  0.0000  
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5  4.523301 2  0.1042  
6  0.294082 2  0.8633  
     
     Joint  355.3695 12  0.0000  
     
          
 
	
